Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Unconstitutional Conviction or Sentence
In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in defendant’s sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Bell, 86A02-2, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, and although the State sought the death penalty, defendant was sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s initial appeal. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing his mandatory life without parole sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and a superior court concluded his sentence was valid in a hearing held in 2014. Defendant then appealed; however, before the Supreme Court could take up the appeal, defendant filed a second MAR arguing gender discrimination in jury selection under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The superior court considering this second MAR found a violation of J.E.B., and both MARs form the basis of the current opinion.
Taking up the J.E.B. claim first, the Supreme Court explained G.S. 15A-1419 operates as a bar to post-conviction review of certain issues like defendant’s J.E.B. claim, unless the defendant can demonstrate good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under G.S. 15A-1419(e). For the reasons stated in State v. Bell, the Court held that defendant’s claim was barred under G.S. 15A-1419.
The Court then moved to the life without parole sentence, explaining defendant challenged the sentence on two fronts, that the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that the sentencing court disregarded mitigating evidence and failed to properly weigh the evidence. The Court disagreed with both of defendant’s assertions, highlighting that the procedure in G.S. 15A-1340.19, the Miller-fix statute, conforms to federal law.
The Court first clarified that “the inquiry is not whether a defendant is permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt; nor is it potential for redemption[,]” meaning that the only requirement was that the superior court comply with the Miller-fix statute when conducting its inquiry. Slip Op. at 18. After establishing this framework, the Court walked through defendant’s specific challenges to the various conclusions of the superior court, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court concluded by dismissing defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard of review, and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, and wrote to highlight issues with the majority’s analysis. Id. at 36.
In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review defendant’s post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and an amendment to the MAR, after receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder. The Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying defendant’s MAR, concluding that defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was not preserved for review and barred by G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Sims, 297PA18, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s appeal. Subsequently defendant filed his initial MAR, which he then amended in 2012 by arguing unconstitutional gender-based discrimination at his trial based on the affidavit of one of the State’s prosecutors at defendant’s trial. This affidavit referenced a specific female juror who was struck on the basis of her gender, as the prosecution was attempting to get more male jurors on the panel. The superior court determined that defendant was in a position to raise the gender-based discrimination claim on direct appeal and his MAR claim was barred. After this, an evidentiary hearing was held in 2022, and the superior court reviewing the MAR of defendant and his co-defendant found gender-based discrimination under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The procedural history and findings of the superior court are detailed in pages 6-14 of the slip opinion.
Taking up defendant’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed whether defendant had preserved his claim “that the prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror on the basis of gender.” Slip Op. at 16. The Court concluded defendant failed to preserve his claim, as constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal are waived, and even if defendant preserved his J.E.B. claim, it was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant argued that he was not able to raise his discrimination claim on direct appeal because he was not yet in possession of the prosecutor’s affidavit, meaning he did not have sufficient evidence to adequately raise the claim at that time. The Court rejected this argument, as “[t]he jury selection transcript reveals pointed statements baldly communicated by the State—in open court—that it wanted to place more men on the jury at the expense of seating women.” Id. at 20. Additionally, the Court noted “the transcripts and questionnaires provide the basis for a statistical analysis of the State’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” Id. at 22. Essentially, the Court held that the evidence of discrimination was obvious from the proceedings and defendant could have performed the statistical analysis supporting the discrimination claim without the prosecutor’s affidavit; defendant’s own statistical expert performed the analysis during the MAR evidentiary hearing with this information.
The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the later discovery of the prosecutor’s affidavit represented good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. As noted above, the Court did not agree that the prosecutor’s affidavit was essential to raising the claim, as “[i]t is evident from the cold record that the remarks made by the State during voir dire put defendant on notice that he needed to raise a J.E.B. objection.” Id. at 27. While acknowledging that the discriminatory behavior in this matter was reprehensible, the Court held that statutory and procedural requirements barred consideration of defendant’s claim as he did not raise it on direct appeal.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, writing separately to note that precedent constrained the possible methods of post-conviction relief in situations like the current case. Id. at 31.
In this Cumberland County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision denying defendant’s constitutional challenge to his sentences of life without parole for murders committed while he was a juvenile.
In August of 1998, defendant was seventeen years old, and a member of the Crips gang, when he participated in the abduction and robbery of three women; defendant and the gang killed two of the women, but one woman survived. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, but the sentence was reduced to two consecutive life sentences without parole after the holding in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that sentencing juvenile offenders to death was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that a mandated life without parole sentence for a juvenile was unconstitutional, but permitted sentencing where the trial court had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Defendant was resentenced in accordance with the Miller-fix statute adopted by the General Assembly, resulting in the imposition of two consecutive terms of life without parole in March 2020. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences in the unpublished decision State v. Tirado, COA20-213 (June 15, 2021), leading to the current opinion.
On appeal, defendant argued that Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution was more protective than the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and his sentences were cruel or unusual punishments and unconstitutional under North Carolina law. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the Cruel or Unusual Punishment clause in the North Carolina Constitution prohibited imposing sentences beyond those authorized by law. The Court reached this conclusion by conducting a historical analysis of the clause along with Article XI, which provides a list of acceptable punishments and has no analogue in the U.S. Constitution. Summarizing the function of these two provisions, the Court noted:
Because a constitution cannot violate itself, we must construe Article I, Section 27’s proscription of cruel or unusual punishments and Article XI’s enumeration of acceptable punishments harmoniously. Logically, therefore, the punishments the people sanctioned in Article XI, Sections 1 and 2 are inherently not “cruel or unusual” in a constitutional sense. Accordingly, an act of the General Assembly cannot violate the Cruel or Unusual Punishments Clause by prescribing a punishment allowable under Article XI, Sections 1 and 2, and similarly, judges cannot violate Article I, Section 27, by handing down a sentence in obedience to such an act.
Slip Op. at 32 (cleaned up). Although defendant argued the North Carolina Constitution was more protective, the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause provided more protection in modern jurisprudence and concluded the Court of Appeals properly evaluated and decided defendant’s appeal in light of the protections afforded by both.
The Court also determined that the trial court’s sentence complied with State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), as that opinion was released after defendant’s appeal. First the Court noted defendant’s case did not meet the criteria of that opinion because “Kelliher applies only to juvenile homicide offenders whom the trial court (1) expressly finds to be neither incorrigible nor irredeemable and (2) sentences to multiple, consecutive terms of life with parole.” Slip Op. at 43. Then the Court clarified that a portion of the Kelliher opinion was obiter dictum, as “the statement requiring the trial court to make an express finding of incorrigibility before sentencing a defendant to life without parole was unnecessary in determining the outcome of the case.” Id. at 44.
Justice Berger, joined by Justices Barringer and Allen, concurred but wrote separately to express concerns with the Kelliher opinion and the precedential weight to which it is entitled. Id. at 46.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only and argued that the majority’s assertions regarding Article I, Section 27 were unnecessary and should be interpreted as dicta. Id. at 50.
In this Cleveland County case, defendant appealed the result of his resentencing hearing for life without parole and the denial of his constitutional challenges to his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s orders.
In 1999, defendant received a sentence of life without parole for a murder committed when he was 16 years old. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants under age 18 were unconstitutional, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller v. Alabama was retroactive. The General Assembly adopted G.S. 15A-1340.19A, referred to by the court as “the Miller statute,” to require a resentencing hearing for every defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed while under 18 and with a sentence of life without parole. Slip Op. at 2. Defendant’s Miller resentencing hearing in 2020 gave rise to the current case.
The Court of Appeals considered three arguments from defendant. First, defendant argued that the resentencing judge erred when he “impermissibly assessed the credibility of witnesses who testified during the 1999 trial, where he was not the presiding judge at that trial.” Id. at 3. The court disagreed, pointing to the language of the Miller statute as well as general practice allowing substitution of new judges during criminal trials. The court concluded “the judge thoroughly reviewed the record and could appropriately assess the credibility of the two co-defendants who testified against Defendant at the 1999 trial.” Id. at 6.
Defendant next argued that the trial court improperly weighed several mitigating factors: “(1) age, (2) immaturity, (3) reduced ability to appreciate risks and consequences, (4) family and peer pressure exerted upon the defendant, and (5) the defendant’s likelihood to benefit from rehabilitation.” Id. at 7. The court walked through the analysis for each factor, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering the mitigating factors.
Finally, the court reached defendant’s constitutional arguments that (1) the Miller statute was unconstitutional as it contained a presumption in favor of life without parole and lacks guidance for resentencing, and (2) that life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and North Carolina constitution. The court rejected both arguments, noting for (1) that State v. James, 371 N.C. 77 (2018), upheld the constitutionality of the Miller statute, and for (2) that State v. Conner, 381 N.C. 643 (2022), and State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), upheld the constitutionality of life without parole sentences. Slip Op. at 10.
In this Cumberland County case, defendant appealed the superior court order sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOPP) for two counts of first-degree murder committed while he was a juvenile. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.
In 1998, defendant was convicted of murdering two law enforcement officers and was sentenced to death. Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the murders. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on direct appeal in State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000). After defendant was convicted, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), holding death sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that a mandatory sentence of LWOPP was unconstitutional for a juvenile; and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller’sprohibition on mandatory LWOPP must be applied retroactively to those already sentenced to mandatory LWOPP. Defendant was initially resentenced to mandatory LWOPP in December of 2005, after filing a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) under Roper. In the current case, defendant filed a MAR in July of 2018, alleging his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller and Montgomery. A sentencing hearing was held in 2022, where the MAR court reviewed the nine mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B and sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of LWOPP.
The Court of Appeals first explained the scope of its review was abuse of discretion, and that the relevant considerations were the mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B(c), along with the additional factor from State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), that the sentencing court must make an express finding of “a juvenile’s permanent incorrigibility” before imposing LWOPP. Slip Op. at 12. The court then grouped defendant’s arguments in two categories, (1) that defendant’s sentence of LWOPP should be reversed based on Kelliherbecause he was capable of reform, and (2) the MAR court incorrectly weighed the mitigating factors of G.S. 15A-1340.19B. Taking up (1), the court quickly dispensed with defendant’s arguments, as defendant did not challenge the findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence and they were binding on his appeal.
Because defendant did not challenge the findings of fact, the court moved to (2), and specifically the weight the MAR court gave to each of the nine mitigating factors and the express finding of incorrigibility under Kelliher. A significant portion of the opinion (pages 15 to 30) were spent examining the factors and the weight given by the MAR court to each. The court ultimately concluded that “the Sentencing Order properly addressed each factor as required by [G.S.] 15A-1340.19A and Kelliher.” Id. at 31. After noting the possible differing views on the mitigating impact of the factors, the court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order.
(1) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had no avenue to obtain review of a trial court order granting his G.S. 15A-1415 MAR (MAR made more than 10 days after entry of judgment) on grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court found that it had authority to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court rejected the contention that State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268 (2006), required a different conclusion, noting that case conflicts with state Supreme Court decisions. (2) The defendant’s claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment was properly asserted under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (convicted/sentenced under statute in violation of US or NC Constitutions) and (b)(8) (sentence unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of disposition or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record or conviction level, was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law).
The trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s 1973 sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on a conviction of second-degree burglary, committed when he was 17 years old, violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendant brought a MAR challenging his sentence as unconstitutional. The court began by noting that the defendant’s MAR claim was a valid under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (unconstitutional conviction or sentence) and (8) (sentence illegal or invalid). On the substantive issue, the court found that unlike a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s sentence “allows for the realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of his life.” In fact, the defendant had been placed on parole in 2008, but it was revoked after he committed a DWI.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Significant Change in the Law
The superior court judge erred by “retroactively” applying Structured Sentencing Law (SSL) provisions to a Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) case. The defendant was sentenced under the FSA. After SSL came into effect, he filed a motion for appropriate relief asserting that SSL applied retroactively to his case and that he was entitled to a lesser sentence under SSL. The superior court judge granted relief. The supreme court, exercising rarely used general supervisory authority to promote the expeditious administration of justice, allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and held that the superior court judge erred by modifying the sentence. The court relied on the effective date of the SSL, as set out by the General Assembly when enacting that law. Finding no other ground for relief, the court remanded for reinstatement of the original FSA sentence.
On the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, the court reversed the trial court and held that no significant change in the law pertaining to the admissibility of expert opinions in child sexual abuse cases had occurred and thus that the defendant was not entitled to relief under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7) (in a motion for appropriate relief, a defendant may assert a claim that there has been a significant change in law applied in the proceedings leading to the defendant's conviction or sentence, and retroactive application of the changed legal standard is required). Contrary to the trial court’s findings and conclusions, State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266 (2002),was not a significant change in the law, but merely an application of the court’s existing case law on expert opinion evidence requiring that in order for an expert to testify that abuse occurred, there must be physical findings consistent with abuse.
The court reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and motion for appropriate relief (MAR), holding that the requirement that counsel advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea agreement established by Padilla does not apply retroactively. The defendant pled no contest to a drug charge in 1997. In 2015 the defendant asserted a MAR claim under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), that he was not informed of the impact his conviction would have on his immigration status, particularly the risk of deportation. The trial court initially denied the MAR but subsequently granted a motion to reconsider and entered an order granting the MAR. Reversing, the court noted that it had previously decided, in State v. Alshaif, 219 N.C. App. 162 (2012), that Padilla does not apply retroactively.
Declining to address whether State v. Garris, 191 N.C. App. 276 (2008), applied retroactively, the court held that the defendant’s MAR was subject to denial because the Garris does not constitute a significant change in the substantive or procedural law as required by G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7), the MAR ground asserted by the defendant. When Garris was decided, no reported NC appellate decisions had addressed whether the possession of multiple firearms by a convicted felon constituted a single violation or multiple violations of G.S. 14-415.1(a). For that reason, Garris resolved an issue of first impression. The court continued: “Instead of working a change in existing North Carolina law, Garris simply announced what North Carolina law had been since the enactment of the relevant version of [G.S.] 14-415.1(a).” As a result, it concluded, “a decision which merely resolves a previously undecided issue without either actually or implicitly overruling or modifying a prior decision cannot serve as the basis for an award of appropriate relief made pursuant to [G.S.] 15A-1415(b)(7).” It thus concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for the reason requested and properly denied the MAR.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Illegal or Invalid Sentence
(1) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had no avenue to obtain review of a trial court order granting his G.S. 15A-1415 MAR (MAR made more than 10 days after entry of judgment) on grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court found that it had authority to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court rejected the contention that State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268 (2006), required a different conclusion, noting that case conflicts with state Supreme Court decisions. (2) The defendant’s claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment was properly asserted under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (convicted/sentenced under statute in violation of US or NC Constitutions) and (b)(8) (sentence unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of disposition or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record or conviction level, was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law).
The trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s 1973 sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on a conviction of second-degree burglary, committed when he was 17 years old, violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendant brought a MAR challenging his sentence as unconstitutional. The court began by noting that the defendant’s MAR claim was a valid under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (unconstitutional conviction or sentence) and (8) (sentence illegal or invalid). On the substantive issue, the court found that unlike a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s sentence “allows for the realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of his life.” In fact, the defendant had been placed on parole in 2008, but it was revoked after he committed a DWI.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Newly Discovered Evidence
In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in defendant’s sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Bell, 86A02-2, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, and although the State sought the death penalty, defendant was sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s initial appeal. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing his mandatory life without parole sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and a superior court concluded his sentence was valid in a hearing held in 2014. Defendant then appealed; however, before the Supreme Court could take up the appeal, defendant filed a second MAR arguing gender discrimination in jury selection under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The superior court considering this second MAR found a violation of J.E.B., and both MARs form the basis of the current opinion.
Taking up the J.E.B. claim first, the Supreme Court explained G.S. 15A-1419 operates as a bar to post-conviction review of certain issues like defendant’s J.E.B. claim, unless the defendant can demonstrate good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under G.S. 15A-1419(e). For the reasons stated in State v. Bell, the Court held that defendant’s claim was barred under G.S. 15A-1419.
The Court then moved to the life without parole sentence, explaining defendant challenged the sentence on two fronts, that the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that the sentencing court disregarded mitigating evidence and failed to properly weigh the evidence. The Court disagreed with both of defendant’s assertions, highlighting that the procedure in G.S. 15A-1340.19, the Miller-fix statute, conforms to federal law.
The Court first clarified that “the inquiry is not whether a defendant is permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt; nor is it potential for redemption[,]” meaning that the only requirement was that the superior court comply with the Miller-fix statute when conducting its inquiry. Slip Op. at 18. After establishing this framework, the Court walked through defendant’s specific challenges to the various conclusions of the superior court, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court concluded by dismissing defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard of review, and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, and wrote to highlight issues with the majority’s analysis. Id. at 36.
In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review defendant’s post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and an amendment to the MAR, after receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder. The Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying defendant’s MAR, concluding that defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was not preserved for review and barred by G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Sims, 297PA18, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s appeal. Subsequently defendant filed his initial MAR, which he then amended in 2012 by arguing unconstitutional gender-based discrimination at his trial based on the affidavit of one of the State’s prosecutors at defendant’s trial. This affidavit referenced a specific female juror who was struck on the basis of her gender, as the prosecution was attempting to get more male jurors on the panel. The superior court determined that defendant was in a position to raise the gender-based discrimination claim on direct appeal and his MAR claim was barred. After this, an evidentiary hearing was held in 2022, and the superior court reviewing the MAR of defendant and his co-defendant found gender-based discrimination under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The procedural history and findings of the superior court are detailed in pages 6-14 of the slip opinion.
Taking up defendant’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed whether defendant had preserved his claim “that the prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror on the basis of gender.” Slip Op. at 16. The Court concluded defendant failed to preserve his claim, as constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal are waived, and even if defendant preserved his J.E.B. claim, it was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant argued that he was not able to raise his discrimination claim on direct appeal because he was not yet in possession of the prosecutor’s affidavit, meaning he did not have sufficient evidence to adequately raise the claim at that time. The Court rejected this argument, as “[t]he jury selection transcript reveals pointed statements baldly communicated by the State—in open court—that it wanted to place more men on the jury at the expense of seating women.” Id. at 20. Additionally, the Court noted “the transcripts and questionnaires provide the basis for a statistical analysis of the State’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” Id. at 22. Essentially, the Court held that the evidence of discrimination was obvious from the proceedings and defendant could have performed the statistical analysis supporting the discrimination claim without the prosecutor’s affidavit; defendant’s own statistical expert performed the analysis during the MAR evidentiary hearing with this information.
The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the later discovery of the prosecutor’s affidavit represented good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. As noted above, the Court did not agree that the prosecutor’s affidavit was essential to raising the claim, as “[i]t is evident from the cold record that the remarks made by the State during voir dire put defendant on notice that he needed to raise a J.E.B. objection.” Id. at 27. While acknowledging that the discriminatory behavior in this matter was reprehensible, the Court held that statutory and procedural requirements barred consideration of defendant’s claim as he did not raise it on direct appeal.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, writing separately to note that precedent constrained the possible methods of post-conviction relief in situations like the current case. Id. at 31.
Reversing the court of appeals, the court held that information supporting the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) was not newly discovered evidence. After the defendant was convicted of drug possession offenses, his father told a probation officer that the contraband belonged to him. The trial court granted the defendant’s MAR, concluding that this statement constituted newly discovered evidence under G.S. 15A-1415(c). The court concluded that because the information implicating the defendant’s father was available to the defendant before his conviction, the statement was not newly discovered evidence and that thus the defendant was not entitled to a new trial. The court noted that the search warrant named both the defendant and his father, the house was owned by both of the defendant’s parents, and the father had a history of violating drug laws. Although the defendant’s father invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial when asked whether the contraband belonged to him, the information implicating him as the sole possessor of the drugs could have been made available by other means. It noted that on direct examination of the defendant’s mother, the defendant did not pursue questioning about whether the drugs belonged to the father; also, although the defendant testified at trial, he gave no testimony regarding the ownership of the drugs.
In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of evidence he was the perpetrator; (2) overruling his objection that the trial court did not make necessary findings on reliability for expert testimony; (3) denying his post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based upon newly-discovered evidence; (4) admitting evidence of his prior removal of an electronic monitoring device; and (5) overruling his objections to the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In January of 2016, officers responded to a call about a fourteen-year-old being shot. While accompanying the ambulance to the hospital, they received a report of additional shots fired, and diverted to the scene, where the officers found defendant running from the area. After arresting defendant, officers found he was carrying a 9mm handgun. The State Crime Laboratory later matched the bullet that killed the victim to this handgun. Defendant was subsequently convicted and appealed.
Taking up defendant’s argument (1), the Court of Appeals explained that because the evidence that defendant was the perpetrator was circumstantial, proof of motive, opportunity, and means were necessary to support the inference that defendant committed the crime. Here, the State admitted evidence that the shooting was in retaliation for a previous shooting two weeks prior, and that the shell casing found at the scene, the bullet in the victim, and defendant’s statements to police all tied him to the murder. As a result, “[a] reasonable juror could find Defendant had the opportunity and means to commit the murder.” Slip Op. at 8.
Turning to (2), the court noted that trial courts enjoy wide latitude when determining admissibility of expert testimony. Here, defendant argued that the State’s firearm expert did not utilize “reliable principles and methods” in violation of Rule of Evidence 702, as the State’s expert utilized a micro-analysis test instead of a lands and grooves test on the projectile, a method disputed by the defense’s expert. Id. at 10. The court found no abuse of discretion as “[t]he superior court made supported findings to resolve purported contradictions between the competing experts.”
Reviewing (3), the court explained defendant’s newly discovered evidence concerned the history of the State’s expert receiving a complaint from a superior court judge as well as a mistake during a firearm examination in a previous case. The court noted that the State was not in possession of the expert’s personnel records and was not aware of the purported mistake, and under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the State had not suppressed material evidence. The court further noted that defendant was not entitled to a new trial as the newly discovered evidence “merely questions the expert witness’ past, not the State’s evidence at this trial.” Id. at 14.
Arriving at (4), the court explained that the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of defendant removing his electronic monitoring device fifteen days before the shooting under Rule of Evidence 404(b) was not error. Defendant “disabled his electronic monitoring device approximately an hour after another murder was committed two weeks earlier in the same area of Wilmington . . . [t]he evidence and timing of these incidents and Defendant’s actions are part of the chain of events that contextualize the crime.” Id. at 16.
Finally, the court dispensed with (5), explaining that the prosecutor’s closing argument did not shift the burden onto defendant, as the statements merely referenced defendant’s failure to refute the evidence admitted at trial. Likewise, the prosecutor’s reference to a link between the murder and retaliation for a previous murder was not an improper reference to “gangs” and was supported by evidence and testimony admitted at the trial.
In this murder case, the trial court properly granted the defendant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. At trial one of the State’s most important expert witnesses was SBI Agent Duane Deaver, who testified as an expert in bloodstain pattern analysis. Deaver testified that the victim was struck a minimum of four times before falling down stairs. Deaver stated that, based on his bloodstain analysis, the defendant attempted to clean up the scene, including his pants, prior to police arriving and that defendant was in close proximity to the victim when she was injured. The court held that Deaver’s misrepresentations regarding his qualifications (discussed in the opinion) constituted newly discovered evidence entitling the defendant to a new trial.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > DNA Testing
Because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the defendant’s MAR claim alleging a violation of the post-conviction DNA statutes, the portion of the trial court’s order granting the MAR on these grounds is void. The court noted that the General Assembly has provided a statutory scheme, outside of the MAR provisions, for asserting and obtaining relief on, post-conviction DNA testing claims.