Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

About

This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

Instructions

Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).

E.g., 12/11/2024
E.g., 12/11/2024

The defendant appealed from judgments entered upon his guilty pleas to second-degree rape and forcible sex offenses, second-degree kidnapping, assault on female, assault by strangulation, obstruction of justice, and intimidating a witness. The defendant appealed by writ of certiorari both the trial court’s imposition of lifetime SBM and the trial court’s imposition of duplicative court costs.

First, the Court of Appeals had to decide whether the defendant’s writs of certiorari properly conferred jurisdiction to the court. The defendant gave oral notice of appeal at his sex offender registration hearing, however he did not specifically raise the issue of court costs or later file a written notice of appeal. The court exercised its discretion to allow the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the lifetime SBM order because they are “authorized to issue a writ of certiorari ‘to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]’ N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1).” Slip op. at 8. Next, the court dismissed the defendant’s oral notice of appeal and instead used its discretion under Rule 21(a)(1) to grant the defendant’s writ of certiorari because it was not the defendant’s fault because it was defendant’s trial counsel who failed to give proper notice of appeal.

(1) The defendant’s first argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) upon his release from prison and contends the state did not meet its burden of proving the imposition of lifetime SBM is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Slip op. at 7.

The Court of Appeals used Gordon and Griffin II as instructive in addressing Grady III’s application to defendants convicted of an aggravated offense and outside the recidivist context. The court stated that “as this Court did in Griffin II, we employ Grady III as a roadmap, ‘reviewing [d]efendant’s privacy interests and the nature of SBM’s intrusion into them before balancing those factors against the State’s interests in monitoring [d]efendant and the effectiveness of SBM in addressing those concerns.’ Griffin II, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 840 S.E.2d at 273.” Slip op. at 10-11.

In evaluating the defendant’s privacy interests, the court determined the defendant has a diminished expectation of privacy in some respects, such as the privacy of his address or matters material to his voluntary participation in certain activities, because the defendant must submit to lifetime sex offender registration and post-release supervision upon release from prison. However, the court found that the defendant’s expectation of privacy would not always be so severely diminished and following the termination of post-release supervision, the defendant’s constitutional privacy rights will be restored and that will occur at some point before the end of the lifetime SBM order. Therefore, the court found that the “[d]efendant will enjoy ‘appreciable, recognizable privacy interests that weigh against the imposition of SBM for the remainder of’ [d]efendant’s lifetime. Griffin II, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 840 S.E.2d at 274.”

The court next evaluated the intrusive nature of SBM and found that “SBM’s ability to track Defendant’s location is ‘uniquely intrusive’, and thus weighs against the imposition of SBM.” Slip op. at 12 (citation omitted).

In considering the state’s interest, the court determined that the state failed to produce evidence that the lifetime SBM, in this case, effectively served legitimate interests such as preventing recidivism. The court explained that the state did not put forth any evidence showing that SBM served those interests and only provided legal conclusions. Therefore, the court determined “the state’s interest in monitoring [d]efendant by SBM during post-release supervision is already accomplished by a mandatory condition of post-release supervision imposing that very thing.” Slip op. 14.

Finally, the court considered the reasonableness of SBM under the totality of the circumstances and balancing the previously mentioned factors. The court decided that in this case, a lifetime SBM order is an unreasonable warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional. The court determined that the defendant’s privacy rights, although diminished during post-release supervision, were substantially infringed upon by the lifetime SBM order and the defendant’s interests were not outweighed by a legitimate state interest because the state failed to provide evidence that a legitimate interest would be served by requiring the defendant be subject to lifetime SBM. 

(2) The defendant next argued that the trial court erred by entering duplicative court costs. The court determined the duplicative costs were error because, following Rieger, “when multiple criminal charges arise from the same underlying event or transaction and are adjudicated together in the same hearing or trial, they are part of a single ‘criminal case’ for the purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304(a).” Slip op. at 15.

Judge Tyson dissented because he did not think the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari concerning the lifetime SBM order should have been granted because it was meritless. Judge Tyson also dissented from the writ of certiorari concerning the imposition of duplicative court costs because the judgements were not part of a “single criminal case.”

(1) The defendant, on trial for multiple drug charges, challenged the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of the only Black juror in the venire under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection, finding that although the “100 percent rejection rate of African American jurors” established a prima facie showing of discrimination, the State gave credible race-neutral reasons for striking the prospective juror, and the defendant therefore did not prove purposeful discrimination. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge or, in the alternative, failed to make adequate findings of fact as required by State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345 (2020). The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the defendant had not preserved the issue because the record did not disclose direct evidence of the race of the challenged juror and the jury selection process was not recorded. The Court held that the record sufficed to permit appellate review when the record of the Batson hearing included express statements, undisputed by the State, that the defendant was African American and that the lone African American in the jury pool was excluded. On the merits of the Batson challenge, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact on its comparative analysis of the answers regarding prior criminal history given by the stricken Black juror (who had a previous child abuse charge dismissed) and a White juror passed by the State (who had a prior drug charge dismissed). The trial court also failed to make findings of fact on the defendant’s argument that the State’s purported concern about the defendant’s “tone of voice” suggested racial bias. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court for specific findings, including, but not limited to the details of the court’s comparative juror analysis and on the defendant’s assertion that the prosecutor’s statements regarding the defendant’s answers to questions and tone of voice evinced racial bias. (2) The trial court erred by assessing costs in each of the four judgments against the defendant. Under State v. Rieger, ___ N.C. App. ___, 833 S.E.2d 699 (2019), the trial court should assess costs only once for cases adjudicated together in the same hearing or trial regarding multiple charges arising from the same underlying event or transaction.

The defendant was stopped in his vehicle for following too closely, and officers discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia in his possession. The defendant was charged with two separate misdemeanor drug offenses and convicted of both at a jury trial. The trial court entered two judgments and assessed two court costs. G.S. 7A-304(a) states that court costs shall be assessed “in every criminal case,” so the issue on appeal was whether this matter represented one case or two (i.e., the one underlying event or the two separate criminal charges). The Court of Appeals concluded that there were reasonable arguments in favor of both interpretations, and neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the statute provides a clear answer. Turning to the spirit and purpose behind the act, the appellate court held that court costs are not intended to be a punishment or a fine; instead, they are only intended to recoup the actual costs imposed on the justice system. “With this in mind, we hold that when multiple criminal charges arise from the same underlying event or transaction and are adjudicated together in the same hearing or trial, they are part of a single ‘criminal case’ for purposes of the costs statute. Accordingly, we vacate the imposition of costs in one of the two judgments against Rieger.”

The trial court erred by ordering costs for fingerprint examination as lab fees. G.S. 7A-304(a)(8) does not allow recovery of lab costs for fingerprint analysis.

The defendant had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before the trial court imposed court costs.

(1) The trial court erred by failing to exercise discretion when ordering the defendant to pay court costs. Ordering payment of costs, the court stated: “I have no discretion but to charge court costs and I'll impose that as a civil judgment.” Amended G.S. 7A-304(a) does not mandate imposition of court costs; rather, it includes a limited exception under which the trial court may waive court costs upon a finding of just cause. The trial court’s statement suggests that it was unaware of the possibility of a just cause waiver. (2) Court costs must be limited to the amounts authorized by G.S. 7A-304.

Show Table of Contents