Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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Reversing the Court of Appeals, the court held that a search of a vehicle located on the premises was within the scope of the warrant. The vehicle in question was parked in the curtilage of the residence and was a rental car of the defendant, an overnight guest at the house. If a search warrant validly describes the premises to be searched, a car on the premises may be searched even though the warrant contains no description of the car. In departing from this general rule, the Court of Appeals held that the search of the car was invalid because the officers knew that the vehicle in question did not belong to the suspect in the drug investigation. Noting that the record was unclear as to what the officers knew about ownership and control of the vehicle, the court concluded; “Nonetheless, regardless of whether the officers knew the car was a rental, we hold that the search was within the scope of the warrant.”
In this case in which the defendant was convicted of drug trafficking and related charges, the court held that although the trial court erred by finding that a vehicle was within the curtilage of the defendant’s residence, it properly found that officers had probable cause to search the vehicle. Officers conducted a drug investigation of the defendant, including surveillance of his residence. During the investigation, a confidential police informant arranged and engaged in a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendant’s residence. A couple of months later the same confidential informant conducted another controlled purchase of heroin at the defendant’s residence. Officers saw the confidential informant purchase the drugs from the defendant at the trunk of a black 1985 Mercury Grand Marquis parked on the other side of the road from the defendant’s residence. Officers saw the vehicle regularly parked in this location during their investigation. As a result of the investigation, Officer Kimel got a search warrant for the defendant’s residence; the warrant did not mention the Grand Marquis. When the officers arrived to execute the search warrant, Kimel saw the vehicle parked across the street. The back and sides of the residence were surrounded by a 7- or 8-foot-high chain link fence; a short wooden fence was in the front of the residence. Kimel asked another officer have his K-9 sniff the vehicle. The dog gave a positive alert for drugs. Kimel obtained the keys to the vehicle from the defendant’s pocket and searched the car. In the trunk, officers found the defendant’s wallet, guns, ammunition, a digital scale, and drugs. After the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle, the defendant pled guilty to multiple drug charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On appeal the defendant argued that the officers searched the vehicle without either a search warrant or probable cause.
The court began by holding that the trial court erred by concluding that the vehicle was within the curtilage of the residence while parked on the side of a public street opposite the home and outside the home’s fenced-in area. The State had conceded this issue at oral argument.
The court went on to find however that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle based on: the controlled purchases by the informant, during which times the Grand Marquis was always present; the officers’ observation of a drug transaction taking place at the trunk of the Grand Marquis; the Grand Marquis parked on a public street near the defendant’s residence during the officers’ investigation; the defendant’s possession of the keys to the Grand Marquis; and the K-9’s positive alert outside of the vehicle for the potential presence of narcotics. It concluded: “Based upon the automobile being located on a public road exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, probable cause justified the officers in conducting the warrantless search of the Grand Marquis.”
In so holding, the court declined to consider the defendant’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the reliability of the K-9 was not sufficiently established under Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), noting that a party may not assert on appeal a theory that was not raised at the trial court. It further noted that the K-9 sniff was not a search and the dog’s positive alert provided support for the trial court’s determination that officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. The court did however note that officers had probable cause to search the vehicle even without the sniff.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the search of the premises was unreasonable. The defendant argued that because the officers deliberately waited until he vacated the premises before breaking open the door without knocking and announcing their presence, they violated the statutory knock and announce requirement. Here, before executing the warrant a detective loudly announced three times that officers would be entering the residence to execute the search warrant. After waiting a reasonable time and hearing no response officers made a forced entry into the residence. These facts establish that no statutory violation occurred.
In a drug case, officers properly knocked and announced their presence when executing a search warrant. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the period of time between the knock and announcement and the entry into the house was too short. It concluded that because the search warrant was based on information that marijuana was being sold from the house and because that drug could be disposed of easily and quickly, the brief delay between notice and entry was reasonable.
Arrest, Search, and Investigation > Search Warrants > Executing > Detaining Persons On or Off the Premises
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (officers executing a search warrant may detain occupants on the premises while the search is conducted), does not justify the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises covered by a search warrant. In this case, the defendant left the premises before the search began and officers waited to detain him until he had driven about one mile away. The Court reasoned that none of the rationales supporting the Summers decision—officer safety, facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight—apply with the same or similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises. It further concluded that “[a]ny of the individual interests is also insufficient, on its own, to justify an expansion of the rule in Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant, wherever he may be found away from the scene of the search.” It stated: “The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” The Court continued, noting that Summers also relied on the limited intrusion on personal liberty involved with detaining occupants incident to the execution of a search warrant. It concluded that where officers arrest an individual away from his or her home, there is an additional level of intrusiveness. The Court declined to precisely define the term “immediate vicinity,” leaving it to the lower courts to make this determination based on “the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.”
In this Craven County case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a Court of Appeals majority opinion overturning the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and vacating defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Court determined that defendant was lawfully detained and searched during the execution of a search warrant even though he was not located on the premises identified by the warrant.
Defendant was the subject of a narcotics investigation and sold heroin to a confidential informant during a controlled buy arranged by the Craven County Sheriff’s Office. Officers obtained a search warrant for the premises used by the defendant during the controlled buy of narcotics, but not for a search of defendant’s person. When executing the search warrant, an officer observed defendant at a neighboring property owned by defendant’s grandfather. The officer detained the defendant, saw what appeared to be a baggie visible in the pocket of defendant’s pants, and patted down the defendant, ultimately finding a baggie containing narcotics. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through that search.
The Supreme Court found that all findings of fact challenged by defendant were supported by competent evidence in the record. The Court then examined whether the search of defendant and warrantless seizure of the narcotics were lawful. Based upon State v. Wilson, 371 N.C. 920 (2018), the Court held that a search warrant carries with it the authority for law enforcement to detain occupants on or in the vicinity of the premises being searched, and defendant was just 60 yards from the premises and close enough to pose a safety threat. The frisk of defendant was justified by the risk that he would be carrying a firearm, given the connection between guns and drug activity. After determining the law enforcement officer had authority to detain and frisk defendant, the Court held that the “plain view” and “plain feel” doctrines supported the warrantless seizure of the baggie found in defendant’s pocket, which was later determined to be a heroin/fentanyl mixture. This analysis determined that the search of defendant was constitutional and the seizure of the baggie of narcotics was permitted, supporting the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
Justice Barringer concurred in part and concurred in the result, but felt that the reasonable suspicion standard under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), would have supported the search and seizure, not necessitating the full analysis the majority utilized.
Justice Earls, joined by Justices Hudson and Morgan, dissented and took issue with the majority’s characterization of defendant as an “occupant” while not located on the premises, ultimately disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of the Wilson analysis as well as the concurrence’s Terry justification.
The defendant was cleaning his car in the street adjacent to his girlfriend’s apartment when several law enforcement officers arrived to execute a search warrant for the apartment. Before entering the apartment, a law enforcement officer approached the defendant and asked for his driver’s license. Officers remained outside with the defendant while the search warrant was executed. Defendant later consented to a search of his vehicle, where officers found marijuana, paraphernalia, and a firearm. He was charged with drug crimes and possession of firearm by a felon.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his vehicle on the basis that the officers obtained the evidence as a result of an unlawful, suspicionless seizure. The court of appeals in State v. Thompson, ___ N.C. App. ___, 809 S.E.2d 340 (2018) (Thompson I) determined, over a dissent, that the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s suppression motion did not resolve a pivotal issue of fact. Thus, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further findings.
The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated Thompson I and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Wilson, 371 N.C. 920 (2018). Wilson addressed the authority of law enforcement officers to detain a person who arrives on the scene while a search warrant is being executed. Wilson held that pursuant to the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), a search warrant authorizes the detention of (1) occupants, (2) who are within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, and (3) who are presented during the execution of a search warrant for the premises. An occupant is a person who poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant.
On remand, and again over a dissent, the court of appeals held that the defendant was not an occupant of the searched premises. The court noted that he remained inside his vehicle and did not attempt to approach the apartment or otherwise interfere with the search. Thus, the court found no circumstances to indicate that the defendant posed a threat to the safe and efficient execution of the search. The court therefore again vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for resolution of material factual disputes, pursuant to Thompson I.
The dissent would have held that the defendant was an occupant of the premises as he was within the line of sight of the apartment being searched and was a threat to enter or attempt to enter the premises.
Officers did not unreasonably seize the defendant in connection with execution of the search warrant. The defendant asserted that his seizure was unreasonable because it occurred two miles away from the residence in question. The court noted in part that the warrant authorized a search of both the premises and the defendant.
An officer executing a search warrant at a home reasonably believed that for officer safety he should pat down the defendant, who was present at the house when officers arrived to execute the search warrant. The search warrant application stated that illegal narcotics were being sold from the residence and that officers had conducted two previous controlled buys there, one only 72 hours earlier. When officers entered, they found six individuals, including defendant and saw drugs in plain view. Based on his experience as a narcotics officer, the officer testified to a connection between guns and drugs.
Arrest, Search, and Investigation > Search Warrants > Executing > Statements Made During Execution of the Warrant
The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements made while a search warrant was being executed. The defendant and his wife were present when the search warrant was executed. After handcuffing the defendant, an officer escorted him to a bathroom, read him Miranda rights, and questioned him about drug activities in the apartment. While this procedure was applied to the defendant’s wife, an officer discovered a digital scale and two plastic bags of a white, powdery substance; the defendant then stated that the drugs were his not his wife’s. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was arrested when he was moved to the bathroom and read his rights, noting that the questioning occurred during the search.
In this drug case, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence collected from his residence on the grounds that the inventory list prepared by the detective was unlawfully vague and inaccurate in describing the items seized. The defendant argued that the evidence gathered from his residence was obtained in substantial violation of G.S. 15A-254, which requires an officer executing a search warrant to write and sign a receipt itemizing the items taken. Specifically, he asserted that the inventory receipt was vague and inaccurate and thus failed to satisfy the statute’s requirements. In order for suppression to be warranted for a substantial violation of the statute, G.S. 15A-974 requires that the evidence be obtained as a result of officer’s unlawful conduct and that it would not have been obtained but for the unlawful conduct. Here, citing prior case law, the court held, in part, that because the evidence was seized before the inventory required by the statute had to be prepared, the defendant failed to show that the evidence would not have been obtained but for the alleged violations of G.S. 15A-254. The court held that G.S. 15A-254 “applies only after evidence has been obtained and does not implicate the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. In turn, because evidence cannot be obtained ‘as a result of’ a violation of [G.S.] 15A-254, [G.S.] 15A-974(a)(2) is inapplicable to either alleged or actual [G.S.] 15A-254 violations.”
In this Watauga County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to indecent liberties with a child, arguing error in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a search of his notebooks. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the trial court.
In May of 2018, officers from the Boone Police Department were investigating child pornography distribution when they discovered files uploaded to a sharing network from defendant’s IP address. The officers obtained a search warrant for defendant’s residence, and during a search of notebooks found at the home for passwords or passcodes related to the child pornography, the officers discovered a reference to a “hands-on sexual offense involving a minor.” Slip Op. at 4. Officers obtained additional search warrants and eventually defendant was indicted for additional counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and sexual offense. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in excess of the scope of the initial search warrant, and to quash the subsequent search warrants. The trial court denied defendant’s motions and he pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress and motion to quash.
Examining defendant’s motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals noted that defendant’s challenge was divided into two issues, (1) that many of the findings of fact were not actual findings or were not supported by competent evidence, and (2) that searching defendant’s notebooks went beyond the scope of the initial search warrant. While the court rejected the majority of defendant’s challenges to the findings of fact in (1), the court did agree several were not appropriately categorized, but explained that it would review them “under the appropriate standard depending on their actual classification, not the label given by the trial court.” Id. at 14.
After walking through defendant’s objections to the findings of fact, the court reached (2), whether the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant by searching through defendant’s substance abuse recovery notebooks. Defendant argued “the agents were allowed to cursorily look in the notebook but immediately upon discovering it was a substance abuse journal, they should have looked no further, not even for passwords or passcodes.” Id. at 17. The court noted this would lead to the absurd result of requiring officers to trust the label or classification of a defendant’s records when performing a search, and rejected defendant’s argument.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the right to have a witness present for blood alcohol testing performed under G.S. 20-16.2 applies to blood draws taken pursuant to a search warrant. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that failure to allow a witness to be present for the blood draw violated his constitutional rights, holding that the defendant had no constitutional right to have a witness present for the execution of the search warrant.
Although an officer “inappropriately” took documents related to the defendant’s civil action against A&T and covered by the attorney-client privilege during his search of her residence, the trial court properly suppressed this material and the officer’s actions did not otherwise invalidate the search warrant or its execution.