Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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The superior court judge erred by “retroactively” applying Structured Sentencing Law (SSL) provisions to a Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) case. The defendant was sentenced under the FSA. After SSL came into effect, he filed a motion for appropriate relief asserting that SSL applied retroactively to his case and that he was entitled to a lesser sentence under SSL. The superior court judge granted relief. The supreme court, exercising rarely used general supervisory authority to promote the expeditious administration of justice, allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and held that the superior court judge erred by modifying the sentence. The court relied on the effective date of the SSL, as set out by the General Assembly when enacting that law. Finding no other ground for relief, the court remanded for reinstatement of the original FSA sentence.
In this Wake County case, two defendants were indicted for murdering the victim and their cases were consolidated for trial. After both defendants were convicted of first-degree murder, they appealed, arguing error in admitting certain evidence, imposing special conditions restricting defendant’s ability to participate in training or educational classes, and denying a motion to sever. The Court of Appeals found no error with the evidence or denying motion to sever, but reversed the portion of the judgments imposing special conditions on the two defendants.
In August of 2019, the victim was shot as he entered his home after being dropped off by a friend. The victim was followed by the two defendants, who were in separate vehicles but coordinating on a facetime call before shooting the victim. They fled in their separate vehicles after the shooting.
The Court of Appeals began with objections to five surveillance videotapes that defendants argued were not properly authenticated. The court rejected the challenge for all five tapes, noting each tape was introduced by witness testimony, and “[e]ach witness testified to the reliability of the surveillance videotaping systems and that the videos that were at trial accurately depicted the original videos recorded by the surveillance systems.” Slip Op. at 3.
The court next considered testimony from an officer regarding data from cell towers showing the movement of defendants on the night of the murder, as defendants argued the officer was not tendered as an expert. Here, no published North Carolina opinion had determined whether this was expert or lay opinion testimony. The court looked to the unpublished State v. Joyner, 280 N.C. App. 561 (2021), and the Iowa Supreme Court opinion State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859 (Iowa 2020). After exploring the applicable caselaw, the court “expressly adopt[ed] the analysis and holding in Boothby” when concluding that most of the officer’s testimony was lay testimony and admissible. Slip Op. at 5. The remaining testimony, while constituting expert testimony, was not prejudicial due to the video evidence previously discussed.
Reaching the special sentencing conditions, the State conceded the trial court’s sentencing conditions barring each defendant from receiving educational or vocational training for the first twenty-two years of imprisonment was error. The court agreed, explaining “[n]owhere in our General Statutes is there language providing a trial judge the authority to restrict a defendant’s rights to vocational training or educational classes while incarcerated.” Id. at 6.
The court also dispensed with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as the defendant in question could not demonstrate unprofessional conduct. And finally, the court noted the motion to sever was properly denied, because although the two defendants presented antagonistic defenses, their respective positions did not represent a conflict that would prevent a fair trial.
In this Davidson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for indecent liberties with a child and statutory sexual offense with a child, arguing he was improperly sentenced. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In November of 2021, defendant was indicted for sexual offenses with his step-grandchildren. At the conclusion of his trial, defendant was sentenced in accordance with G.S. 15A-1340.17(d). Relevant for defendant’s appeal, in 2011 the General Assembly passed S.L. 2011-192, the “Justice Reinvestment Act,” that amended G.S. 15A-1340.17 to provide a stiffer penalty for offenses committed after December 1, 2011.
On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was unclear as to the dates when he committed the offenses, and that he should have been sentenced with the version of G.S. 15A-1340.17 applicable for offenses prior to December 1, 2011. The Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing to testimony from one of the victims about how old she was when the abuse occurred. The court explained that “[e]ven drawing inferences from this testimony that are mathematically favorable to Defendant, this evidence tends to show the conduct continued until at least 2014[,]” after the December 1, 2011, effective date. Slip Op. at 6.
The trial court erred by granting the defendant’s MAR and retroactively applying 2009 amendments to the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to the defendant’s 2005 offenses. The court reasoned that the Session Law amending the SSA stated that “[t]his act becomes effective December 1, 2009, and applies to offenses committed on or after that date.” Thus, it concluded, it is clear that the legislature did not intend for the 2009 grid to apply retroactively to offenses committed prior to December 1, 2009.