In this appeal by the Mecklenburg County Sheriff from orders of the Superior Court ordering the Sheriff to release two individuals from his custody, the court vacated and remanded to the trial court to dismiss the habeas corpus petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant Lopez was arrested for common law robbery and other charges and was incarcerated in the County Jail after arrest on a $400 secured bond. He then was served with an administrative immigration arrest warrant issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Additionally DHS served the Sheriff with an immigration detainer, requesting that the Sheriff maintain custody of Lopez for 48 hours to allow DHS to take custody of him. Defendant Chavez was arrested for impaired driving and other offenses and detained at the County Jail on a $100 cash bond. He also was served with a DHS administrative immigration warrant, and the Sheriff’s office was served with a DHS immigration detainer for him. On October 13, both defendants satisfied the conditions of release set on their state charges, but the Sheriff continued to detain them pursuant to the immigration detainers and arrest warrants. That day they filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in Superior Court. The Superior Court granted both petitions and, after a hearing, determined that the defendant’s detention was unlawful and ordered their immediate release. However, before the court issued its orders, the Sheriff’s office had turned physical custody of both of the defendants over to ICE officers. The Sheriff sought appellate review.

     The court began by rejecting the defendants’ argument that the cases were moot because they were in ICE custody. The court found that the matter involves an issue of federal and state jurisdiction invoking the “public interest” exception to mootness, specifically, the question of whether North Carolina state courts have jurisdiction to review habeas petitions of alien detainees held under the authority of the federal government.

     The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that it should not consider the 287(g) Agreement between the Sheriff and ICE because the Agreement was not submitted to the Superior Court. It noted, in part, that the Agreement is properly in the record on appeal and an appellate court may consider materials that were not before the lower court to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.

     On the central issue, the court held that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the defendants’ habeas petitions. It began by rejecting the defendants’ argument that the Superior Court could exercise jurisdiction because North Carolina law does not allow civil immigration detention, even when a 287(g) Agreement is in place. Specifically, they argued that G.S. 162-62 prevents local law enforcement officers from performing the functions of immigration officers or assisting DHS in civil immigration detentions. The court declined to adopt a reading of the statute that would forbid Sheriffs from detaining prisoners who were subject to immigration detainers and administrative warrants beyond the time they would otherwise be released from custody or jail under state law. Moreover, the court noted that G.S. 128-1.1 specifically authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to enter into 287(g) agreements and perform the functions of immigration officers, including detaining aliens.

     Finding the reasoning of cases from other jurisdictions persuasive, the court held that “[a] state court’s purported exercise of jurisdiction to review the validity of federal detainer requests and immigration warrants infringes upon the federal government’s exclusive federal authority over immigration matters.” As a result, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction or any other basis to receive and review the habeas petitions or issue orders other than to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

     Further, it held that even if the 287(g) Agreement between the Sheriff and ICE did not exist or was invalid, federal law—specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)-(B)--allows and empowers state and local authorities and officers to communicate with ICE regarding the immigration status of any person or otherwise to cooperate with ICE in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States. It continued: “A state court’s purported exercise of jurisdiction to review petitions challenging the validity of federal detainers and administrative warrants issued by ICE, and to potentially order alien detainees released, constitutes prohibited interference with the federal government’s supremacy and exclusive control over matters of immigration.”

     The court added: “[a]n additional compelling reason that prohibits the superior court from exercising jurisdiction to issue habeas writs to alien petitioners, is a state court’s inability to grant habeas relief to individuals detained by federal officers acting under federal authority.” The court cited Supreme Court decisions as standing for the proposition that no state judge or court after being judicially informed that a person is imprisoned under the authority of the United States has any right to interfere with the person or require the person to be brought before the court. On this point it stated: “In sum, if a prisoner’s habeas petition indicates the prisoner is held: (1) under the authority, or color of authority, of the federal government; and, (2) by an officer of the federal government under the asserted ‘authority of the United States’, the state court must refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus.” Here, it was undisputed that the Sheriff’s continued detention of the defendants after they were otherwise released from state custody was pursuant to federal authority delegated to the Sheriff’s office under the 287(g) Agreement, and after issuance of immigration arrest warrants and detainers. Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) indicates state and local law enforcement officers act under color of federal authority when performing immigration functions authorized under 287(g) agreements. Thus, the Sheriff was acting under the actual authority of the United States by detaining the defendants under the immigration enforcement authority delegated to him under the agreement, and under color of federal authority provided by the administrative warrants and detainer requests. The court next turned to whether the Sheriff was acting as a federal officer under the 287(g) Agreement by detaining the defendants pursuant to the detainers and warrants, noting that the issue was one of first impression. Considering federal authority on related questions, the court concluded: “To the extent personnel of the Sheriff’s office were deputized or empowered by DHS or ICE to perform immigration functions, including detention and turnover of physical custody, pursuant to the 287(g) Agreement, we find . . . federal cases persuasive to conclude the Sheriff was empowered and acting as a federal officer by detaining Petitioners under the detainer requests and administrative warrants.” Because the defendants were being detained under express, and color of, federal authority by the Sheriff who was acting as a de facto federal officer, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction, or any other basis, to receive, review, or consider the habeas petitions, other than to dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction, to hear or issue writs, or intervene or interfere with the defendants’ detention in any capacity. The court went on to hold that the proper jurisdiction and venue for the defendants’ petitions is federal court.