Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. ___ (Jun. 27, 2023)
For about two years, Counterman, the petitioner in this case, sent hundreds of Facebook messages to a local artist. The two had never met, and the woman never responded. A number of the messages expressed anger at the artist and envisaged harm upon her. The messages put the artist in fear and upended her daily life. Counterman was charged under a Colorado stalking statute making it unlawful to “[r]epeatedly . . . make[] any form of communication with another person” in “a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person . . . to suffer serious emotional distress.” Slip Op. at 2.
Counterman moved to dismiss the charge on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his messages were not “true threats” and thus could not form the basis of a criminal prosecution. In line with Colorado law, the State had to show that a reasonable person would have viewed the Facebook messages as threatening but did not have to prove that Counterman had any subjective intent to threaten. The trial court decided that Counterman’s statements rose to the level of a true threat, and the Colorado Court of Appeals Affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider (1) whether the First Amendment requires proof of a defendant’s subjective mindset in true threats cases and (2) if so, what mens rea is sufficient.
In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court concluded that in order to prevent a chilling effect on speech, the State must show a culpable mental state. The Court reasoned that although this requirement make prosecution of some otherwise prohibited speech more difficult, it reduces the prospect of chilling fully protected expression.
The Court further concluded that recklessness was the most appropriate mens rea in the true threats context. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause harm to another. In the threats context, it means that the speaker is aware that others could regard his statements as threatening violence and delivers them anyway. Slip Op. at 11. The Court concluded that the recklessness standard “offers enough breathing space for protected speech without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats.” Slip Op. at 14.
The State had to show only that a reasonable person would have understood Counterman’s statements as threats but did not have to show any awareness on his part that the statements could be understood that way. The Court held that this was a violation of the First Amendment, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Justice Sotomayor, joined partly by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the conclusion that some subjective mens rea is required in true-threats cases and that in this particular case, a mens rea of recklessness is sufficient, but noting that she would not reach the distinct conclusion that a mens rea of recklessness is sufficient for true threats prosecutions generally and that requiring nothing more than a mens rea of recklessness is inconsistent with precedent and history.
Justice Barrett dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas. The dissent reasoned that the requirement of a subjective element unjustifiably grants true threats preferential treatment as compared to other contexts involving unprotected speech, and the result may sweep much further than the opinion lets on.