In a per curiam decision, the court reversed the court of appeals for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion. In the opinion below, Lovette v. North Carolina Department of Correction, 222 N.C. App. 452 (2012), the court of appeals, over a dissent, affirmed a trial court order holding that the petitioners had fully served their life sentences after credits had been applied to their unconditional release dates. Both petitioners were sentenced to life imprisonment under former G.S. 14-2, which provided that a life sentence should be considered as imprisonment for eighty years. They filed habeas petitions alleging that based on credits for “gain time,” “good time,” and “meritorious service” and days actually served, they had served their entire sentences and were entitled to be discharged from incarceration. The trial court distinguished Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249 (2010) (in light of the compelling State interest in maintaining public safety, regulations do not require that the DOC apply time credits for purposes of unconditional release to those who committed first-degree murder during the 8 Apr. 1974 through 30 June 1978 time frame and were sentenced to life imprisonment), on grounds that the petitioners in the case at hand were not convicted of first-degree murder (one was convicted of second-degree murder; the other was convicted for second-degree burglary). The trial court went on to grant the petitioners relief. The State appealed. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not err by distinguishing the case from Jones. The court also rejected the State’s argument that the trial court’s order changed the petitioners’ sentences and violated separation of powers. Judge Ervin dissented, concluding that the trial court's order should be reversed. According to Judge Ervin, the Jones applied and required the conclusion that the petitioners were not entitled to have their earned time credits applied against their sentences for purposes of calculating their unconditional release date.