State v. Ambriz, 2022-NCCOA-711, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 1, 2022)

In this Guilford County case, Defendant appealed his convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions and denial of his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals found no error.  

In February of 2016, defendant was a part of a group who were involved in a drug deal with a confidential informant working with the Greensboro Police Department. The deal involved transport of a large amount of methamphetamine from Alabama to Greensboro. After observing defendant and his associates transport methamphetamine to a storage unit, police arrested defendant, and he was indicted on the trafficking charges. Defendant was tried three separate times; the first two, in April of 2018 and August of 2019, resulted in deadlocked juries. Defendant was eventually convicted after a trial in May of 2021. 

The court first considered defendant’s arguments regarding sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, noting that the State presented substantial evidence to support defendant possessed the methamphetamine under an “acting in concert” theory. Slip Op. at 9-10. The court then applied the same evidence to the transporting element of defendant’s convictions, again finding substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 11-12. Finally, examining the conspiracy elements, the court found ample evidence of communication and cooperation with co-conspirators supporting the conviction. Id. at 14. 

The procedural history of defendant’s three trials is extensive and detailed on pages 17-18 of the slip opinion; notably the case began before COVID-19 delays but was also subject to delays during 2020. The court explained that North Carolina courts follow the four-factor analysis from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), when performing a speedy trial analysis. Id. at 19. To determine whether a violation occurred, the court examined all of defendant’s speedy-trial motions and walked through the four Barker factors, determining that: (1) the length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a speedy-trial analysis; (2) although the choices to prosecute one of defendant’s co-conspirators, and to perform transcription of the contact between co-defendants and of the trial proceedings contributed to the delay, they did not represent the State’s negligence or willful delay; (3) the defendant asserted his right to speedy trial repeatedly; and (4) the delay was not prejudicial to defendant’s ability to present a defense as he did present any witnesses or evidence. After walking through the Barker analysis, the court concluded that the balance favored the State.