State v. Barker, COA23-1090, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Jul. 2, 2024)

In this Mecklenburg County case, defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor death by motor vehicle, arguing that as a police officer he was exempt from speeding under G.S. 20-145 and that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error. 

Defendant, a Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department officer, was driving at high speed early in the morning of July 8, 2017, when he struck and killed a pedestrian. The posted speed limit in the area was 35 miles per hour, and defendant was going approximately 100 miles per hour when he struck the pedestrian. Defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter, and after a trial, the jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle.  

Taking up defendant’s argument regarding G.S. 20-145, the Court of Appeals explained that the statute exempted law enforcement officers from speed limitations when they were in the pursuit of a criminal suspect, unless the officer acts with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Defendant argued that it was “illogical for the jury to find that he was not culpably negligent (in acquitting him for involuntary manslaughter) but to also find that he did break a law (speeding) which necessarily requir[ed] (based on G.S. 20-145) that the jury [] find he acted with culpable/gross negligence in his speeding.” Slip Op. at 3. The court disagreed on the logical possibility, explaining that while the burden was on the State to prove culpable negligence for the manslaughter charge, the State needed only to prove that defendant was speeding to support the death by motor vehicle charge. The burden then shifted to defendant to assert the affirmative defense “that he was not acting with gross negligence while he was speeding.” Id. at 7. Reviewing under the plain error standard the court found no error and no merit in various other arguments raised by defendant based on the same reasoning. 

Defendant also argued that the prosecutor asked the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes, which the court explained was improper under applicable Supreme Court precedent. However, here the court did not agree that the arguments were improper, and instead held that they were trying to illustrate the victim “was a typical citizen like the jurors.” Id. at 10.