State v. Carwile, COA23-885, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Dec. 17, 2024)

In this Lincoln County case, defendant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor communicating threats, arguing (1) plain error in failing to give the jury an instruction on the defense of habitation, and (2) error by refusing to give his requested special jury instruction. The Court of Appeals found no error.

In September of 2018, a masked man approached defendant’s house, grabbed a chainsaw off defendant’s front porch and entered the house, striking defendant with the chainsaw. Defendant fought off the intruder, and their fight continued out into the yard, through a neighbor’s yard, and into a nearby car dealership parking lot. By the time they had reached the car dealership, the intruder had dropped the chainsaw and was backing away from defendant with his hands raised. At this point, defendant’s wife and another man staying at defendant’s home arrived, and all three began beating the intruder. Defendant continued to slam the intruder’s head into the concrete and beat him even as the intruder lay motionless on the ground. The intruder died of the injuries sustained from the beating. At trial, defendant asserted defense of habitation, and requested a special jury instruction. The trial court denied defendant’s requested instruction, and defendant did not object to the jury instructions given at trial.

For (1), defendant argued the following Castle Doctrine instructions were necessary: “(a) his fear for his life was presumptively reasonable; (b) an aggressor instruction clarifying that a person is ‘not the aggressor while defending their home’; and (c) he was allowed to threaten [the intruder] with lawful force.” Slip Op. at 5. The Court of Appeals disagreed, and reviewed each disputed instruction in turn. In (a), the court looked to G.S. 14-51.2(c), where the General Assembly provided exceptions to the presumption of reasonable fear. The court noted that the intruder had clearly exited defendant’s home, and based on the evidence, had also “discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter” defendant’s home. Id. at 9. Resolving (b), the court concluded “the evidence shows Defendant became the aggressor when Defendant continued to pursue [the intruder] after [the intruder] discontinued his efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter the home and tried to leave.” Id. at 12-13. Finally in (c), the court noted that under the facts of this case defendant was not entitled to use deadly force under the Castle Doctrine and “[t]hus, Defendant’s contention that if deadly force is justified, so too is communicating threats fails because Defendant’s use of deadly force was not justified.” Id. at 14. The court also dispensed with defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims as he was not entitled to the Castle Doctrine in this case.

Coming to (2), the court noted that defendant’s requested instruction focused on the intruder’s use of force and inability to assert self-defense while committing a felony, and attempted to extend State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185 (2022), “to the conduct of [the intruder], arguing that [the intruder] used impermissible force against Defendant because he was in the process of fleeing a felony when he fled Defendant’s home.” Slip Op. at 20. The court found that this was not supported by legal authority as the intruder “is not a criminal defendant and is not asserting self-defense as an affirmative defense for his conduct.” Id. Additionally, to the extent defendant’s requested instruction dealt with defendant’s right to self-defense, the jury was properly instructed on that concept and the court found no error in the instructions as given.