State v. Clapp, 235 N.C. App. 351 (Aug. 5, 2014)

(1) In a child sexual assault case, the trial court did not err by refusing the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence concerning his character for honesty and trustworthiness as substantive evidence of his guilt or innocence. At trial, five witnesses testified that the defendant was honest and trustworthy. The defendant requested an instruction in accordance with N.C.P.J.I. 105.60, informing the jury that a person having a particular character trait “may be less likely to commit the alleged crime(s) than one who lacks the character trait” and telling the jury that, if it “believe[d] from the evidence [that the defendant] possessed the character trait” in question, it “may consider this in [its] determination of [Defendant’s] guilt or innocence[.]” The trial court would have been required to deliver the requested instruction if the jury could reasonably find that an honest and trustworthy person was less likely to commit the crimes at issue in this case than a person who lacked those character traits. Although “an individual’s honesty and trustworthiness are certainly relevant to an individual’s credibility, we are unable to say that a person exhibiting those character traits is less likely than others to commit a sexual offense [such as the ones charged in this case].” (2) In a child sexual assault case, in which the defendant was charged with having sexual contact with student athletes who came to him for help with sports injuries, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow a defense witness to testify that the defendant possessed the character trait of working well with children and not having an unnatural lust or desire to have sexual relations with children. The defendant argued that the evidence should have been admitted since it related to a pertinent character trait that had a special relationship to the charged crimes. Citing State v. Wagoner, 131 N.C. App. 285, 293 (1998) (the trial court properly excluded evidence showing the defendant’s “psychological make-up,” including testimony that he was not a high-risk sexual offender, on the theory that such evidence, which amounted to proof of the defendant’s normality, did not tend to show the existence or non-existence of a pertinent character trait), the court concluded that the evidence in question “constituted nothing more than an attestation to Defendant’s normalcy” and was properly excluded.