State v. Coffey, COA22-883, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 20, 2024)

In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for obstruction of justice, arguing (1) obstruction of justice is not a cognizable common law offense in North Carolina; and (2) the indictments were insufficient to allege common law obstruction of justice. The Court of Appeals disagreed with (1), but in (2) found the indictments were fatally defective, vacating defendant’s convictions. 

Defendant was a deputy sheriff in Granville County, where he held instructor certifications that allowed him to teach in-service courses and firearms training for law enforcement officers. In October of 2021, defendant was charged for falsely recording that the sheriff and chief deputy had completed mandatory in-service training and firearms qualifications. After a trial, defendant was found guilty of twelve counts of obstruction of justice.

Beginning with (1), the Court of Appeals explained that G.S. 4-1 adopted the existing common law, and “obstruction of justice was historically an offense at common law, and our courts have consistently recognized it as a common law offense.” Slip Op. at 5.  

Reaching (2), the court noted “[o]ur courts have defined common law obstruction of justice as ‘any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal justice.’” Id. at 8, quoting In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670 (1983). The court then set about determining what constituted an act under this definition, noting examples such as “false statements made in the course of a criminal investigation” and “obstructing a judicial proceeding.” Id. However, the court pointed out that “the act—even one done intentionally, knowingly, or fraudulently—must nevertheless be one that is done for the purpose of hindering or impeding a judicial or official proceeding or investigation or potential investigation” Id. at 12. That element was missing from the current case, as “there [were] no facts asserted in the indictment to support the assertion Defendant’s actions were done to subvert a potential subsequent investigation or legal proceeding.” Id. at 13. This meant the indictments lacked a necessary element of common law obstruction of justice, and were fatally defective.  

Chief Judge Dillon, joined by Judge Stading, concurred by separate opinion and suggested that defendant may have committed another offense from common law such as “misconduct in public office.” Id. at 15.