State v. Copley, 195A19-2, ___ N.C. ___ (May. 23, 2024)

In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed a Court of Appeals decision upholding defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder. The Court held that the trial court erred when providing the lying-in-wait instruction to the jury, but because defendant was convicted on two theories of first-degree murder, his conviction was upheld and no new trial was necessary. 

In 2016, the victim attended a party in defendant’s neighborhood. During the night, crowds of people gathered outside defendant’s house, and he became angry, yelling at some of the people outside. Defenant called 911 and claimed the people outside were vandalizing his property, and he went to his garage with a shotgun. Later, as the victim crossed defendant’s yard near the curb, defendant shot and killed him. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by premeditation and deliberation, and by lying in wait. He appealed, reaching the Supreme Court for the first time in State v. Copley, 374 N.C. 224 (2020), arguing the prosecutor improperly mentioned race in closing arguments. The Court found no prejudicial error and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the remaining arguments. The Court of Appeals considered defendant’s three remaining arguments and found no error, leading to the current appeal. 

The Supreme Court first considered defendant’s argument that the trial court should have intervened during closing argument when the prosecutor suggested defendant could not invoke the defense of habitation because he was the aggressor. The Court explained the standard of review was gross impropriety because defendant did not object at trial; this standard requires that the remarks be both improper and prejudicial. Here, the Court held that the prosecutor did not misstate the law, as “the prosecutor never labeled him the ‘aggressor’ for purposes of self-defense, but instead characterized discrete actions as ‘aggressive.’” Slip Op.at 11. 

The Court then moved to the challenged jury instructions, beginning with defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the defense of habitation is unavailable to an aggressor. The Court explained that the instruction came from footnote 4 of N.C. Pattern Jury Instruction 308.80, and dealt with provocation, not with the aggressor doctrine. The Court also noted that defense counsel requested aggressor language in the self-defense instruction, inviting the error defendant then referenced on appeal. 

Finally, the Court reached the lying-in-wait instruction for first-degree murder, explaining that the castle doctrine was relevant to the consideration of defendant’s case. The Court explained that “[i]f the statutory castle doctrine applies, it disclaims the elements of lying in wait and displaces that offense.” Id. at 20. In the current case, the Court held that “the trial court’s lying-in-wait instruction distorted the interplay between the crime and the castle doctrine” and deprived defendant of his right to defend his home. Id. at 22. However, because defendant was also convicted under the premeditation and deliberation theory, this error did not merit a new trial.