(1) At his trial for habitual DWI, the defendant took the stand, denied driving, and admitted his prior DWI convictions in explaining why he did not drive on the night in question and why, based on his past interactions with law enforcement, he did not speak to the arresting officers. On cross-examination, the State asked the defendant about the offense, date, and place of each of those convictions. The defendant asked the trial judge to instruct the jury pursuant to North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 105.40, which instructs that the jury should not consider a defendant’s prior convictions as evidence of the defendant’s guilt in the current case. The trial judge refused to give the instruction. Relying on State v. Jackson, 161 N.C. App. 118 (2003), the Court of Appeals found no error. Per that opinion, a defendant is not entitled to a special instruction instructing the jury to consider a defendant’s testimony about prior convictions for purposes of the defendant’s credibility only, where the defendant initially offers the testimony on direct examination. The Court held that the State’s cross-examination of the defendant in this case was limited and did not constitute sufficient impeachment to require the instruction. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that it should reconsider Jackson, finding that it was bound by the prior decision. (2) Before his first trial on the habitual DWI charge, the defendant moved for and the trial judge conducted an in camera review of the arresting officers’ personnel records. The trial judge denied release, finding no favorable and material evidence, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial in an unpublished opinion. On appeal in this case, the defendant asked the Court of Appeals to review the records, which the trial judge had placed under seal at the first trial. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal, having failed to make any motion asking the trial judge to review the records before his second trial. The Court stated that a mistrial has the legal effect of no trial. Therefore, the defendant could not rely on a motion made at his first trial to preserve issues for appeal at his later trial.