Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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State v. Farook, COA23-1161, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Dec. 31, 2024)
In this Rowan County case, defendant appealed his convictions for felony hit and run inflicting serious injury or death and two counts of second-degree murder, arguing (1) violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) insufficient showing of malice to support his murder convictions, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel by conceding guilt without his consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denials of defendant’s speedy trial motion and motion to dismiss, but reversed and remanded for a hearing on the issue in (3).
In June of 2012, defendant was driving when he crossed the centerline and hit a motorcycle, killing both the operator and passenger of the motorcycle. A witness saw defendant get out of his car, look at the wreck, then walk away. Defendant turned himself in two days after the wreck, and was placed in jail in June of 2012. Defendant remained in jail until shortly before his trial in October 2018. After being convicted, defendant appealed in State v. Farook, 274 N.C. App. 65 (2020), and the Court of Appeals reversed on speedy trial grounds. The North Carolina Supreme Court then reversed that decision in part and affirmed in part in State v. Farook, 381 N.C. 170 (2022). These opinions contain extensive detail of the timeline of the case. After the trial court held a new hearing and denied defendant’s speedy trial motion in October 2022, defendant again appealed, leading to the current opinion.
In (1), the Court of Appeals began by establishing the speedy trial test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and the four applicable factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Slip Op. at 10 (quoting State v. Spinks, 277 N.C. App. 554 (2021)). Here, the court noted “there is no question the six-year delay here is presumptively prejudicial and requires we weigh all four Barker factors,” and proceeded to examine the trial court’s order and defendant’s challenged findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 12. After a lengthy examination, the court examined evidence regarding the backlog in the court system, a delay in the state crime lab processing a blood sample, and defendant shuffling through several attorneys. After weighing the four Barker factors, the court concluded “[w]hile the first factor in the Barker analysis – length of the delay – shows presumptive prejudice, the State rebutted this presumption with its extensive evidence as to the reasons for the delay, specifically the backlog of the court system in Rowan County during Defendant’s trial.” Id. at 50. Because the collective factors did not weigh in defendant’s favor, the court affirmed the order denying his motion.
Moving to (2), the court explained that the element of malice was the issue in question, and because defendant did not intentionally kill the victims, the State had to prove malice by showing “defendant had the intent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result.” Id. at 53 (quoting State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386 (2000)). The State argued malice here by showing defendant’s license was revoked due to an impaired driving violation at the time of the crash, defendant drove left of the centerline, and defendant was slurring his words and smelled of alcohol. The court also looked to testimony that defendant looked at the victims and then fled the scene instead of rendering aid, and defendant did not properly identify himself to a law enforcement officer who spoke to him after the crash, as defendant had changed his name from the one the officer used. Taken together, the court concluded these facts represented malice and defendant’s motion was properly denied.
Reaching (3), the court found an error under State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), as defense counsel conceded guilt in closing arguments by asking the jury to find defendant guilty of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle instead of the more serious charges. The court looked to the Harbison inquiry and noted defendant “consented to admission of certain elements of the offenses, but his counsel admitted guilt to the entire lesser-included offenses.” Slip Op. at 61. The court went on to explain “[e]ven if Defendant consented to admission of all the elements of an offense, it is not clear Defendant was aware the consequences of that action would be conceding guilt to the entire offense.” Id. at 63. As a result, the court remanded for a hearing on whether defendant knowingly consented to the admission of guilt.