State v. Fritsche, 344PA21, ___ N.C. ___ (Dec. 15, 2023)

In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision that defendant’s petition for early termination of his sex offender registration was properly denied. 

In November of 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child in Colorado. After completing his sentence in 2008, he registered as a sex offender in Colorado. Defendant moved to North Carolina in October 2020, and petitioned under G.S. 14-208.12B for a determination as to whether he must register as a sex offender. The trial court determined that defendant must register, and he did in April 2021. Subsequently, defendant filed a petition under G.S. 14-208.12A, arguing that his registration should be terminated as it had been over ten years from the date he initially registered in Colorado. The trial court denied this petition, relying on In re Borden, 216 N.C. App. 579 (2011), for the proposition that the statute only allows removal of defendant’s registration after he has been registered for ten years in North Carolina. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition, holding that the plain meaning of the statute required ten years of registration in North Carolina.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to take up defendant’s argument that the Court of Appeals improperly interpreted G.S. 14-208.12A. Specifically, the Court considered whether the word “county” as used in the statute meant any county or only North Carolina counties, concluding that “[b]ecause the definitions under Article 27A refer specifically to counties in North Carolina, ‘initial county registration’ in section 14-208.12A must mean the first registration compiled by a sheriff of a county in the state of North Carolina.” Slip Op. at 6. The Court noted this conclusion was supported by “the General Assembly’s silence since the Court of Appeals decided In re Borden in 2011.” Id. at 7. 

Justice Barringer, joined by Justice Dietz, concurred by separate opinion and would not have adopted the General Assembly’s acquiescence from its silence after In re Borden. Id. at 9. 

Justice Earls dissented and would have allowed defendant’s petition for termination of his registration. Id. at 11.