Because the State failed to give notice of its intent to use aggravating sentencing factors as required by G.S. 20-179(a1)(1), the trial court committed reversible error by using those factors in determining the defendant’s sentencing level. The case involved an appeal for trial de novo in superior court. The superior court judge sentenced the defendant for impaired driving, imposing a level one punishment based on two grossly aggravating sentencing factors. On appeal, the defendant argued that the State failed to notify him of its intent to prove aggravating factors for sentencing in the superior court proceeding. The State did not argue that it gave notice to the defendant prior to the superior court proceeding. Instead, it argued that the defendant was not prejudiced because he received constructive notice of the aggravating factors when they were used at the earlier district court proceeding. The court rejected this argument, determining that allowing the State to fulfill its statutory notice obligations by relying on district court proceedings “would render the statute effectively meaningless.” The court concluded that the State “must provide explicit notice of its intent to use aggravating factors in the superior court proceeding.” The court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.