State v. Julius, 95A22, ___ N.C. ___ (Oct. 20, 2023)

In this McDowell County case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a warrantless vehicle search. The Supreme Court held that the search and seizure were not justified under any applicable warrantless search exception and remanded the case to the trial court.

In May of 2018, sheriff’s deputies responded to the scene of a hit-and-run where a vehicle was partially submerged in a ditch. The driver fled the scene before deputies arrived due to outstanding warrants against him, but defendant was present and spoke to the deputies about the accident, explaining that it was her parents’ car but she was not the driver. Because defendant could identify the driver only by his first name, one of the deputies began searching the vehicle for his identification without consent from defendant. Eventually the deputy discovered a box that contained methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, defendant was arrested, and a search of her backpack found additional contraband. At trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of the search, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment; the trial court denied the motion and she was convicted of possession and trafficking in methamphetamine. On appeal, the Court of Appeals majority affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion, finding that the warrantless search was incident to arrest and permitted. The dissent disagreed, noting the driver was not arrested, and pointed out the automobile was immobile meaning the automobile exception also did not apply. Defendant appealed based upon this dissent, leading to the current case. 

The Supreme Court noted that “the Court of Appeals held that the search incident to arrest exception justified the warrantless search and merely noted without further explanation that the search still could have been justified as ‘an inventory [search] or for officer safety.’” Slip Op. at 8. For (A) search incident to arrest, the Court explained that this exception is motivated by officer safety and preservation of evidence. Under applicable precedent, officers may search the area of a vehicle within reaching distance of a suspect being arrested, and may conduct a search before an arrest, if the arrest occurs contemporaneous with the search and probable cause existed. Here, the driver fled the scene and could not reach any part of the vehicle. Additionally, “the State presented no evidence at the suppression hearing that [the driver] was ever arrested, let alone arrested contemporaneously with the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 11. Moving to defendant, who was a bystander outside the vehicle, “[t]here was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that the interior of the vehicle was accessible to defendant or that there were any safety concerns for the officers.” Id. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the search incident to arrest exception was inapplicable. 

The Court then turned to (B) the automobile exception, and explained “[m]obility of the vehicle is a fundamental prerequisite to the application of the automobile exception.” Id. at 12, quoting State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 637 (1987). Here, this essential principle was missing, as the vehicle was stuck in a ditch. The Court observed that “[i]n fact, [a deputy] testified that he called a tow truck to remove the vehicle from the ditch.” Id. at 13. The Court held this exception was also inapplicable to the case, and no other exceptions plausibly applied. 

After determining the evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court moved to whether the exclusionary rule, which would exclude the results of the search, should apply. Because the trial court previously concluded a valid search occurred, it never considered whether the exclusionary rule was an appropriate remedy. As a result, the Court remanded the matter for consideration of whether to exclude the evidence. 

Chief Justice Newby concurred in part and dissented in part by separate opinion, and would have held that the deputies acted reasonably and did not violate the Fourth Amendment while searching the vehicle for the driver’s identification. He concurred that the appropriate resolution if the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated was to remand to the trial court. Id. at 18. 

Justice Riggs did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.