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  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.
  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.

  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.
  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.
  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.
  • Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium is no longer available. Effective June 2025, personnel changes and resource limitations have made it impossible for us to maintain the Compendium to the standard of excellence that the School of Government strives to achieve. We appreciate those who have used and supported the Compendium over the years. We will continue to publish and archive summaries of North Carolina appellate cases concerning criminal law on the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog.

State v. Loftis, ___ N.C. App. ___, 830 S.E.2d 648 (Mar. 26, 2019)

In this drug case, the trial court did not err by admitting a forensic laboratory report after the defendant stipulated to its admission. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to engage in a colloquy with her to ensure that she personally waived her sixth amendment right to confront the analyst whose testimony otherwise would be necessary to admit the report. State v. Perez, __ N.C. App. __, __, 817 S.E.2d 612, 615 (2018), establishes that a waiver of Confrontation Clause rights does not require the type of colloquy required to waive the right to counsel or to enter a guilty plea. In that case, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing him to stipulate to the admission of forensic laboratory reports without engaging in a colloquy to ensure that he understood the consequences of that decision. The court rejected that argument, declining the defendant’s request to impose on trial courts an obligation to personally address a defendant whose attorney seeks to waive any of his constitutional rights through a stipulation. In Perez, the court noted that if the defendant did not understand the implications of the stipulation, his recourse is a motion for appropriate relief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish Perez on grounds that it involved a written stipulation personally signed by the defendant, while this case involves defense counsel’s oral stipulation made in the defendant’s presence. The court found this a “distinction without a difference.” Here, the stipulation did not amount to an admission of guilt and thus was not the equivalent of a guilty plea. The court continued:

[W]e . . . decline to impose on the trial courts a categorical obligation “to personally address a defendant” whose counsel stipulates to admission of a forensic report and corresponding waiver of Confrontation Clause rights. That advice is part of the role of the defendant’s counsel. The trial court’s obligation to engage in a separate, on-the-record colloquy is triggered only when the stipulation “has the same practical effect as a guilty plea.”