State v. Maney, COA24-894, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May. 21, 2025)

In this Jackson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for numerous sexual offenses against a child, arguing error in (1) admitting improper evidence under Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) allowing the State to make improper prejudicial statements, and (3) failing to sign documents requisite to defendant’s appeal. The Court of Appeals found no error.

The charges against defendant arose from years of sexual abuse directed at his daughter and was corroborated by testimony from his ex-wife, who was also subject to sexual abuse by defendant. Before trial in 2020, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of his ex-wife’s testimony, but did not object to the portions of testimony at trial that subsequently formed the basis of his appeal. During closing arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the minor victim several times; defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments. After trial, the trial court delayed for 19 months in signing the required appellate entries, as the trial court judge retired without signing the documents.

Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals walked through the various testimony from defendant’s ex-wife that he found objectionable, based around defendant’s threats to harm her, urging her to have an abortion, holding a knife and gun to her head, and other threatening acts towards her and her baby. Here the court found justification for admission under Rule 404(b), as the testimony “was probative of numerous aspects of the State’s case because it added context and illustrated Defendant’s state of mind when victimizing members of his family.” Slip Op. at 8. The court walked through the probative nature of the behavior, also noting that “a rational jury could have questioned why [the ex-wife] failed to report the abuse, thereby undermining her testimony about the rape, but the State utilized the challenged testimony to illustrate Defendant’s erratic, violent, and threatening behavior to explain [the ex-wife’s] failure to report the abuse.” Id. at 9. As the acts were substantially similar to the crimes charged, and admitting the testimony did not unfairly prejudice defendant, the court found no error in allowing the testimony.

Moving to (2), the court noted that under State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208 (1993), the prosecutor’s statements were improper, as a prosecutor cannot ask the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim. However, due to the overwhelming evidence against defendant, “they did not prejudice Defendant to the level necessary to warrant a new trial.” Slip Op. at 18.

For (3), the court looked to the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S 514 (1972), to determine if the delay in defendant’s appeal amounted to a prejudicial violation. As a delay of more than one year is presumptively prejudicial, the court continued to the analysis in the other three factors. The court noted that it was not clear that the delay was intentional due to the trial judge’s retirement. Defendant did not urge his appeal after the initial filing, weighing against him in the analysis. Additionally, the court saw no harm to defendant’s appellate arguments or preparation. As a result, the court concluded defendant was not prejudiced by the delay and found no merit in his appeal.

Judge Arrowood concurred only in the result.