State v. Spivey, 368 N.C. 739 (Mar. 16, 2016)

On discretionary review of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 240 N.C. App. 264 (2015), the court reversed, holding that an indictment charging the defendant with injury to real property “of Katy’s Great Eats” was not fatally defective. The court rejected the argument that the indictment was defective because it failed to specifically identify “Katy’s Great Eats” as a corporation or an entity capable of owning property, explaining: “An indictment for injury to real property must describe the property in sufficient detail to identify the parcel of real property the defendant allegedly injured. The indictment needs to identify the real property itself, not the owner or ownership interest.” The court noted that by describing the injured real property as “the restaurant, the property of Katy’s Great Eats,” the indictment gave the defendant reasonable notice of the charge against him and enabled him to prepare his defense and protect against double jeopardy. The court also rejected the argument that it should treat indictments charging injury to real property the same as indictments charging crimes involving personal property, such as larceny, embezzlement, or injury to personal property, stating:

Unlike personal property, real property is inherently unique; it cannot be duplicated, as no two parcels of real estate are the same. Thus, in an indictment alleging injury to real property, identification of the property itself, not the owner or ownership interest, is vital to differentiate between two parcels of property, thereby enabling a defendant to prepare his defense and protect against further prosecution for the same crime. While the owner or lawful possessor’s name may, as here, be used to identify the specific parcel of real estate, it is not an essential element of the offense that must be alleged in the indictment, so long as the indictment gives defendant reasonable notice of the specific parcel of real estate he is accused of injuring.

The court further held that to the extent State v. Lilly, 195 N.C. App. 697 (2009), is inconsistent with its opinion, it is overruled. Finally, the court noted that although “[i]deally, an indictment for injury to real property should include the street address or other clear designation, when possible, of the real property alleged to have been injured,” if the defendant had been confused as to the property in question, he could have requested a bill of particulars. 

Error | UNC School of Government

Error

The website encountered an unexpected error. Please try again later.