Child Welfare Case Compendium

Mother argued transcript of TPR proceeding was inadequate. Mother failed to demonstrate that the narration of proceedings agreed upon by the parties and judicially noticed orders and reports were inaccurate or inadequate and precluded appellate review.

Affirmed NC court had modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter the adjudication and disposition order and subsequent permanency planning orders. Letter from NY court exercising continuous exclusive jurisdiction was sufficient to relinquish jurisdiction over the child custody determination and allow the NC court to obtain modification jurisdiction.

PWC granted. Mother and Father’s argument that the trial court erred has merit because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter neglect adjudication and disposition orders after dismissing the juvenile petitions with prejudice, and the parties showed extraordinary circumstances because of the substantial harm from separation of a family due to a void order and lack of finality in the juvenile case.

Testimony of forensic interviewer and nurse practitioner were not improper, therefore Father's counsel was not deficient by failing to object to the evidence and Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Affirmed TPR. No abuse of discretion in determining termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of both children after the court considered all factors listed in G.S. 7B-1100 and made findings regarding those relevant.

TPR affirmed. Challenged findings, except one disregarded finding, are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and support the conclusion that Mother failed to make reasonable progress that led to the child's removal. Includes discussion of Mother's limited ability to complete components of her case plan during periods of incarceration.

Affirmed termination of Father's parental rights on the ground of Father's conviction of a sexually related offense resulting in conception of the child. The court held the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child is a sexually related offense under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(11).

North Carolina court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter custody order under UCCJEA.

Insufficient evidence that the proposed guardians jointly understood the legal significance and responsibilities of guardianship.

TPR affirmed. Challenged findings are supported by competent evidence and other unchallenged binding findings establish abandonment. Findings are sufficient and support conclusion of willful abandonment.

Father did not preserve the issue of the attorney's role as the child's GAL for appellate review.

This is an appeal of a private TPR, where father’s rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment, neglect by abandonment, and neglect. The court of appeals affirmed the ground of abandonment and discussed the jurisprudence regarding the affirmation of one ground is sufficient to support a TPR order.

No abuse of discretion in awarding guardianship to an in-state person without the benefit of the completed ICPC home study of another potential out-of-state placement. Order was based on children's best interests and supported by findings and conclusions. Evidence shows court received adequate evidence of the guardian's understanding of the legal significance of the placement. No error in closing matter, relieving DSS and GAL, but retaining jurisdiction.

Discussion of admission of child's statements under both the residual hearsay exception and statement of a party opponent exception to hearsay. Held admission was erroneous and prejudiced mother.

Findings do not support the conclusion of dependency of two older juveniles. There was no contrary evidence to mother’s testimony that she was willing and able to care for the two older juveniles and continue to parent the youngest juvenile. Supported findings regarding arguments between mother and one of the juveniles and the older juveniles' voluntary placement with relatives are insufficient to establish dependency.

Insufficient findings to support neglect adjudication. REVERSED AND REMANDED, ___ N.C. ___ (March 22, 2024) (per curiam).

Affirmed trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings under the UCCJEA. Trial court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction to enter initial, temporary nonsecure custody orders, and at the time of adjudication, NC had acquired home state jurisdiction, as Mother and children involved in the case had lived in the state for over six months and no other custody order existed in any other state with jurisdiction.

Mother waived defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when counsel appeared at TPR hearing and cross-examined witnesses. Mother failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

U.S Supreme Court held: (1) Congress has the power to enact ICWA; (2) ICWA does not violate the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment; and (3) No party has standing to raise the equal protection claim and the nondelegation challenge regarding the placement preferences.

No abuse of discretion in ceasing reunification efforts based on prior TPR. Vacate and remand no visitation order for failing to include findings about parent's constitutional rights and whether their forfeited their right to visit and if visits are not in the child's best interests.

Abuse of discretion for trial court to amend its TPR order pending appeal to specify that it applied clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard.

Affirmed TPR order from remand. Trial court followed the Supreme Court's mandate language to review and reconsider the record, finding two TPR grounds based on the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard.

Findings at initial dispositional hearing do not support father acted inconsistently with their parental rights.

Affirmed denial of TPR based on grounds of willful failure to pay child support, neglect, and willful abandonment. Discusses standard of review for a TPR adjudication.

Sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that there was no bond between the mother and child.

No abuse of discretion when court made findings of fact about all G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors, supported by competent evidence, and determined TPR was in the child's best interests.

No available caretaker for the juvenile for an indefinite period of time supports the conclusion of a substantial risk of harm. Findings support adjudication of neglect.

Findings support trial court's adjudication of older juvenile as abused and younger juveniles as neglected

Release of mother's provisional counsel at TPR hearing was proper.

TPR affirmed based on mother's willful failure to make reasonable progress. Mother failed to preserve collateral estoppel argument regarding the court's consideration of two prior neglect adjudication orders.

Evidence found to be sufficient to support the findings to conclude father's abandonment. TPR affirmed.

Service of TPR petition and summons was found proper. Summons met statutory requirements.

Pleading found sufficient to put father on notice of grounds for TPR.

Mother presented sufficient evidence of the existence of a child support order and father's willful failure to pay. Remand warranted.

Father satisfied all three statutory requirements mandating his consent to the child's adoption.

Trial court made sufficient findings to eliminate reunification and verify custodians' understanding of placement and adequacy of resources.

Neglect adjudication affirmed for newborn. Newborn does not have to return home from the hospital for a neglect adjudication.

Sufficient findings to support adjudication of neglect and dependent juvenile, a medically fragile infant. Dissent discusses findings mirroring allegations in the petition.

Neglect and dependent adjudication affirmed. Mother waived constitutional argument for appellate review when failed to raise issue at the adjudicatory or dispositional hearing.

Reversed Court of Appeals' decision reversing trial court's dependency adjudication. Discussion of evidentiary issues involving mother's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and trial court's findings regarding the dependency adjudication.

Insufficient findings to support adjudication of neglect and dependent juvenile involving infant. Findings do not establish both parents were unable to provide proper care or supervision and lacked appropriate alternative care arrangements.

TPR affirmed based on neglect. Discusses lack of explanation for juvenile injuries in determining likelihood of future neglect.

TPR affirmed. Court did not abuse discretion in deciding to exclude mother's expert witness testimony at disposition.

Order granting TPR on grounds of failure to make reasonable progress determined to be sufficient with minimal findings.

No abuse of discretion when considering G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors to determine TPR in best interests of the child. Trial court found no parent-child bond.

Trial court's findings that the notice requirements of G.S. 7B-1108.1 were met were not supported by competent evidence. Court erred in making no inquiries about whether mother received notice of the TPR hearing.

First-degree murder conviction and the fact DSS will not engage father with service plan supports determination of likelihood of future neglect.

TPR affirmed. Adjudicatory findings beyond judicially noticed underlying juvenile case file support conclusion of neglect.

TPR affirmed based on willful abandonment.

Failure to make findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(d) requires a remand for entry of additional findings required to eliminate reunification as a permanent plan; however, does not require TPR order to be vacated.

TPR affirmed based on sufficient findings of the likelihood of future neglect by both mother and father. Discusses domestic violence and likely reunion of parents following father's release.

Order's statement that the court has jurisdiction over the parents and subject matter is sufficient under the UCCJEA.

No abuse of discretion in determination of children's best interest. Trial court has discretion to determine the weight to give competing G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors.

Respondent mother failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel at TPR hearing.

No abuse of discretion in denial of motion to continue TPR hearing. Respondent father failed to show there were extraordinary circumstances warranting a further continuance.

No abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the juvenile's best interests. Discusses mental health needs of the juvenile.

Adjudication of neglect cannot be based solely on prior DSS involvement related to other children.

TPR affirmed based on failure to make reasonable progress.

TPR affirmed based on failure to pay. In-kind contributions acknowledged but do not supplant court-ordered payments.

Required findings under G.S. 7B-905.1 were not met where court ordered no visits with incarcerated mother and did not address mother's visitation rights upon her imminent release.

TPR reversed. Motion with attached orders from underlying juvenile case failed to allege sufficient facts to warrant a determination that a ground exists.

Trial court made substantive changes to the TPR order after the appeal was pending. Amended order is void and the original order is reviewed for the appeal.

TPR reversed. Findings insufficient to support TPR based on grounds of willful failure to pay reasonable costs of child care.

TPR reversed. Insufficient findings to support conclusion of dependency.

TPR petitioner had standing where record shows juvenile resided with the petitioner for the requisite time period.

Evidence and findings support determination of a likelihood of future neglect. Mother’s failure to make progress on their case plan and continued DV is indicative of a likelihood of future neglect.

No abuse of discretion in best interests determination. Trial court has authority to weigh the evidence at disposition and is not bound by GAL recommendations or equity between the parents' rights.

DV and failure to follow case plan show neglect likely to be repeated for juvenile who lived in home where other juveniles were neglected.

Opinion addresses minimum outline for visits, virtual visits, and notice of motion to review visits.

DSS provided reasonable efforts to mother.

Findings support court's determination of a likelihood of future neglect. TPR affirmed.

The findings about father not attempting to contact mother or family when he had the ability to do so support the court's determination that he acted willfully and abandoned his child.

TRP vacated and remanded. Some findings were unsupported by the evidence. Discussion of father's substance use and whether that is sufficient to TPR on neglect or failure to make reasonable progress.

Father waived his right to review of the court's failure to make findings about his constitutionally protected rights to care, custody, and control of his child when ordering guardianship at a permanency planning hearing.

Discussion of parent acting inconsistently with protected status by voluntarily leaving children with grandmother for 3 years prior to DSS involvement. Guardianship order affirmed. There is a dissent. Opinion discusses precedent on the issue of nonparent custody arrangements and parent's protected constitutional status.

TPR on failure to pay child support denied. Court used discretion to not terminate so lack of finding about there being a child support order was harmless. Opinion discusses challenges to findings of fact as well as the conclusion of law that grounds did not exist.

The language of G.S. 7B-1101 regarding service on a nonresident parent impacts personal and not subject matter jurisdiction. Father waived the defense of insufficient service of process when he made a general appearance without objection.

Court applied wrong standard of proof at TPR adjudication, which is error. Proper remedy is reverse and remand, not vacate to end case.

TPR on neglect does not require to be able to regain custody of child at time of TPR.

Likelihood of future neglect supported by findings and evidence of domestic violence, lack of appropriate housing, and mother's minimal efforts to remain in contact with and stay informed about her child. Favorable findings regarding progress on substance use portion of case plan does not preclude conclusion based on other findings.

No abuse of discretion in determining best interests to TPR. Father raised COVID-19 restrictions to argue court abused its discretion.

Court is not required to give priority to relative placement when considering best interests at TPR. No abuse of discretion.

Discussion of findings being supported by evidence in disposition. G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors reviewed. No abuse of discretion.

TPR affirmed on ground of neglect. Rejected father's argument that prior neglect was not caused by him.

Findings did not address impact of housing instability, drug use, and mental health on the children. The 5th Amendment privilege cannot be used as a sword and a shield.

No abuse of discretion in determining TPR in child's best interests: parent-child bond, likelihood of adoption

Mother did not meet burden of showing extraordinary circumstances existed for continuance of TPR under GS 7B-1109(d) or that she was prejudiced by denial of motion to continue.

Court of appeals did not conduct de novo review of adjudication of neglect. Vacated and remanded to court of appeals.

Father waited too long to show progress to avoid a finding that there was a likelihood of future neglect. TPR on neglect affirmed. Discussion of housing, substance use, and domestic violvence.

Neglect adjudication affirmed. Business record exception applied to drug test results. There was harm to the juvenile and a substantial risk of harm.

TPR affirmed. Discussion of aiding and abetting murder of a child as ground for TPR.

Attack on prior permanency planning order not preserved for appeal. No misapprehension of law by trial court. At TPR disposition, consideration of dispositional alternatives are not required.

TPR affirmed. Court was not required to consider relative placement at disposition.

No error by trial court in not delaying dispositional hearing when case "fast-tracked" due to court relieving DSS of reunification efforts at initial dispositional hearing. There was not a strong parent-child bond at the time of the TPR hearing.

Neglect adjudication reversed and remanded. Court did not make ultimate findings regarding substantial risk of harm to the child. Discussion of mirroring allegations in the petition.

NC had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to modify a NY custody order. The exception to subject matter jurisdiction based on a party's unjustifiable conduct (GS 50A-208) does not apply. Assuming it did, the exceptions in GS 50-208(a)(1), (2) apply.

Pending action for legislative amendment applied. Eliminate reunification requires G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d) findings.

TPR on abandonment affirmed.

Private TPR on abandonment affirmed. Findings are supported by the evidence.

Unchallenged findings are binding and challenged findings were supported by the evidence. No abuse of discretion.

Court did not apply a misapprehension of law re: time period of parent's progress given it overruled DSS objection about post-petition evidence. Judge is presumed to have disregarded incompetent evidence and mother did not show reliance on that evidence. Findings on all evidence presented is not required.

Findings support conclusion of willful abandonment. Judge has authority to determine witness credibility and draw/reject inference from the evidence when there is conflicting evidence.

Relative placement is not a priority under TPR statutes (unlike A/N/D statutes). Court did not abuse its discretion in determining TPR was in child's best interests.

Neglect affirmed. Compliance with a case plan does not preclude a TPR on neglect. Parents continued to deny responsibility and acknowledge concerns. Likelihood of repetition of neglect supported by the findings, which was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The findings do not support eliminating reunification and awarding guardianship. Discussion of parents acting inconsistently with their parental rights and required findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d). Important factor was another child was born and remained in the home with the parents.

Mother did not argue and cannot show prejudice on IAC claim. There is a dissent that would have remanded for further factfinding on counsel's performance.

There were no findings of the likelihood of future neglect.

Findings support conclusion of dependent juveniles.

No abuse of discretion when ordering 1 hour of supervised visits a week.

Reversing TPR. No evidence child was born out of wedlock or that father did not take any of the 5 actions enumerated in G.S. 7B-1111(a)(5).

This opinions discusses ICWA notice requirements and the court's compliance with ensuring DSS made due diligence to notify tribes and BIA. Lack of notice was cured at post-TPR hearing, rejecting parent's argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the TPR.

Court did not misapprehend the law or abuse its discretion when determining TPR was in child's best interests despite mother having executed a specific relinquishment.

Court had subject matter jurisdiction in underlying neglect action to give DSS director standing to file TPR petition. Discussion of "director," venue, and verification of petition when child was placed in out-of-state safety placement during assessment.

Significant connection/substantial evidence prong met under UCCJEA when child had no home state at time underlying neglect petition was filed. This opinion is an appeal of a TPR raising subject matter jurisdiction (and best interests).

Findings were insufficient because they did not address father's conduct during the relevant 6-month period. Dispositional findings are not considered by the appellate court on an appeal of an adjudication. Evidence was presented; vacated and remanded.

Challenged findings that are not supported by the evidence are disregarded on appeal. Parent's failure to make progress on case plan is indicative of likelihood of future neglect. Juvenile's adjudication as neglected shows prior neglect. TPR affirmed.

TPR on neglect affirmed. Evidence supports findings of risk of harm to children and likelihood of future neglect related to mother's substance use and mental health.

Time period to assess reasonable progress is up to the adjudicatory hearing. G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2) is not precluded as a ground if parent refuses to sign case plan or court does not order specific remedial steps for parent to take. Court has authority to determine witness credibility, give weight to evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Discussion of judicial notice of PPO included in this opinion.

Relying on stare decisis and In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360 (2020), parent has an inherent duty to support their child. Lack of notice is not a defense re: willfulness on the grounds under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(3).

At adjudication stage of TPR, parent's constitutional rights over child's best interest prevail. At disposition, child's best interests is the polar star.

Guardianship affirmed. Evidence supported findings and findings supported conclusion that mother acted inconsistently with her parental rights, guardian understood legal significance of appointment, and reunification efforts would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the children's health or safety.

Appeal under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(5) dismissed without prejudice as being premature. Opinion superseded by unpublished opinion.

TPR on neglect affirmed. Examines likelihood of future of neglect. Issues involve housing and DV.

Petition complied with G.S. 7B-1104(2) regarding standing of petitioners.

Subject matter jurisdiction in a TPR does not require the action be filed in the same county where there is an underlying A/N/D action.

TPR on neglect affirmed. Discusses what constitutes a finding, appellate review of findings, and judicial notice. Mother's progress was extremely limited and supporting finding that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect.

Trial court held a proper adjudicatory hearing when testimony by DSS social worker reaffirmed under oath the allegations in the TPR petition. Affirmed in part.

Findings do not address the determinative 6-month time period under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(3). There is a dissent in part (4-3)

There was no evidence of the circumstances at the time of the TPR hearing. Court could not conclude parent did not have ability to provide proper care and supervision.

Voluntary support agreement (VSA) for child support is treated like an order. Findings of mother's VSA and failure to pay anything toward cost of child's care is sufficient to conclude ground under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(3) exists.

"Services Needed" is treated the same as "substantiated." DSS was required to file petition when respondent refused to comply with in-home services plan. Evidence supports adjudication of neglected juveniles.

Order vacated and remanded for application of clear and convincing evidence standard re: parent acting inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as a parent.

Findings were insufficient and not supported by competent evidence to support neglect or dependency adjudications. Discussion of findings, ultimate findings, conclusions of law. Reversed for dismissal. There is a dissent. Reasonable efforts also discussed.

Court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting inquiry into mother's competency even though she had an intellectual disability warranting services and supports.

G.S. 7B-1110(a) does not require findings about dispositional alternatives the court considered. No abuse of discretion.

No abuse of discretion in best interests determination. Opinion looks at child's consent to adoption, bond with parent, and possible relative placement.

TPR affirmed on failure to pay reasonable cost of care. Obligation to pay exists regardless of parent's wealth or poverty.

4-3 opinion, affirming TPR and determining no abuse of discretion when court granted father's motion to withdraw.

Findings required by statute that are not made is reversible error. Remand for findings addressing eliminating reunification, ceasing further reviews, and waiving further hearings. There is a dissent.

No abuse of discretion in denying father's request for a new attorney and Rule 17 GAL

Facts were insufficient for dependency ground, vacated and remanded.

The findings supporting the ground of neglect for TPR were not based solely on father's incarceration.

TPR on willful abandonment affirmed. Father cannot use his incarceration as a shield.

Although the trial court applied the wrong time period when examining the parent's failure to make reasonable progress, it examined father's actions and made findings up to the date of the TPR hearing. Poverty is not an element of the ground such that an affirmative finding about poverty is not required. TPR affirmed.

The court has discretion to give greater weight to G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors than the child-parent bond.

Dependency affirmed based on death of sibling and refusal to believe it was intentional by possible caregivers and mother. There's also a neglect adjudication as well as consolidated TPR in this case.

Consolidated TPR and A/N/D adjudication and disposition put mother on notice that permanency will be at issue. GS 7B-901(c) aggravating factor found for initial dispositional hearing.

This is an appeal of a PPO together with a TPR. This opinion discusses the language of G.S. 7B-1001(a2), addressing insufficient findings in a PPO, supreme court precedent, and the appropriate remedy of remand.

TPR reversed and remanded. Court must comply with the ICWA inquiry of each participant as to whether they know or have reason to know the child is an Indian child.

Mother was not entitled to a continuance based on her argument that she was denied due process rights against self-incrimination with a pending criminal charge. Discussion of GS 7B-803.

This opinion discusses judicial notice. The court improperly applied judicial notice. The other findings support the court's conclusion to award custody to father.

Court properly considered father's limitations in making progress to correct the conditions due to his incarceration, which including considering his behavior further limited his opportunities to engage in services and delayed his release date. There is a dissent.

GS 7B-905.1(d) requirements to advise parties of right to review is not required when the court is holding periodic permanency planning hearings.

Neglect adjudication affirmed.

Mother's recent progress on her case plan in the 4 months before the TPR hearing was not enough to rectify the issues that led to the child's prior adjudication of neglect based on her substance use. TPR on neglect affirmed.

Findings regarding mother's failure to make reasonable progress to correct conditions re: domestic violence were supported by the evidence. TPR affirned.

TPR on neglect and BIC affirmed. LIkelihood of future neglect determination was supported by the evidence and was not defeated by recent progress mother started making after TPR filed. No abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in BIC.

Trial court determines credibility of testimony, the weight of the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn. Here, father's conduct over 5 years supported court's conclusion that he willfully abandoned children during the relevant 6-month period.

Findings supported conclusion that mother failed to make reasonable progress on her case plan involving substance use.

This opinion discusses Rule 63 - the role of a substitute judge and held the actions were more than ministerial such that the orders were a nullity. It further discusses stipulations of fact and what may be relied upon for an adjudication.

Opinion discusses verification of custodian's understanding of legal significance of placement.

Older juvenile's express preference should be given weight when considering visitation. GAL did not comply with duty to convey express preference to court.

The opinion affirms a TPR that is challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It addresses 7B-1101, the UCCJEA, the parent's age of minority, and transfer of the child's custody to her parent's resident state of VA.

The opinion discussed findings that are not supported by the evidence and reverses a TPR on abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (a)(7).

Errors in the challenged findings were harmless given related unchallenged findings. The findings support the conclusion of a likelihood of future neglect. TPR affirmed.

TPR neglect adjudication reversed based on findings that were not supported by the evidence and the findings do not address risk of harm to the juvenile or the likelihood of future neglect.

This opinion interprets the role of the respondent's GAL under G.S. 7B-1101.1(d) and determines there is no violation of that statute when the GAL assisted the court-appointed attorney in presenting respondent's case to the court. There is a dissent.

This opinion addresses the role of a substitute judge on remand under Rule 63. It also addresses an argument that substitute judge resolved an evidentiary conflict. An appeal should not be morphed into a question of culpability of the parent. Adjudication affirmed.

This opinion reverses and remands for a new hearing a TPR based on mother not knowingly and voluntarily waiving her right to counsel and by the court allowing her privately retained attorney to withdraw. A discussion of what inquiries the court is required to make is included in this opinion. There is a dissent.

This opinion discusses statutory construction of G.S. 7B-1109(f). The court does not err by stating the standard of proof (clear, cogent, and convincing evidence) at the open TPR hearing but not in the written TPR order.

The court considered each individual child's circumstances including the bond with mother and with each other. There was no abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the children's best interests.

G.S. 7B-1101 authorizes a TPR to be filed in a different county than where a pending A/N/D action exists. The court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the TPR.

A stepparent is a caretaker and does not have standing to appeal.

Neglect adjudication reversed and petition dismissed. The trial court relied solely on an adjudication of a sibling without any finding about risk of harm to these juveniles.

Discussion of signatures on notice of appeal by attorney for mother and her Rule 17 GAL.

The required findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d) were not made when the court eliminated reunification as a permanent plan and ceased reunification efforts.

TPR on dependency reversed because there was no evidence or findings about the lack of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.

The standard of review for best interests is an abuse of discretion and is not de novo. A strong bond between a parent-child is only one factor for the court to consider, and the court determines how much weight to give the factors.

Private TPR on basis of neglect is affirmed. Review of facts that support conclusion of past neglect (without DSS involvement) and likelihood of future neglect.

TPR on ground of dependency affirmed. Mother's continued extended incarceration supports the court's conclusion that she is incapable of providing care and supervision. Her release date ranging from 22 -42 months after the TPR hearing is the foreseeable future and the trial court's finding of the later, rather than earlier date, does not prejudice mother.

TPR on ground of neglect affirmed. Unchallenged findings support substantial risk of harm to the juvenile and the likelihood of future neglect.

Mother's attorney's actions of a brief cross examination of the one adjudication witness and a conciliatory closing argument was not disparaging of mother such that the performance was deficient or would prejudiced mother such that there was a reasonable probability of a different result.

Remanded to determine whether the ICWA notice provisions were complied with and whether the child is an Indian child.

No abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the 15 year old's best interest and in finding it was also in his best interests to waive his consent to his adoption. Father did not preserve issue of the juvenile's statutory due process rights.

The court determined weight and credibility of the evidence. The unchallenged findings support the conclusion that father made minimal progress in his case plan - a plan he had notice of through the court orders that required him to comply with the case plan.

This opinion discusses whether a court is required to sua sponte make an inquiry into a parent's incompetency for purposes of a Rule 17 GAL. In this case the parent was adjudicated incompetent and appointed a guardian of the person under Ch. 35A. The court in the TPR case did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an inquiry.

TPR for willful abandonment affirmed. Discusses incarceration and limitations on respondent father as well as the conduct occurring outside of the determinative 6-month period. There is a dissent.

Father's delay in obtaining a psychosexual evaluation resulting in it being provided to the attorney the day before the TPR hearing does not meet the extraordinary circumstances criteria of G.S. 7B-1109(d) for granting a continuance. Father waived his constitutional argument for the basis of the continuance. The review is an abuse of discretion, which did not occur. Continuances are disfavored.

The findings are support by clear and convincing evidence. The findings of mother's lack of reasonable progress in complying with her case plan and it being willful support the conclusion that grounds exists under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2).

The court did not abuse its discretion in not taking additional evidence on remand. The new findings support the conclusion of neglect.

DSS had standing to file TPR petition. The court had jurisdiction to enter a nonsecure custody order on a motion of DSS in an action where the petition was file in 2008 since the court retained jurisdiction in the action.

The findings support the court's conclusion that there is a likelihood of neglect. TPR affirmed. There is a dissent.

Findings demonstrating jurisdiction under the UCCJEA are not required but the record must reflect jurisdiction exists.

There was no evidence or findings about a lack of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. TPR on dependency ground reversed. There is a dissent.

The TPR for neglect discusses abandonment and likelihood of repetition of neglect and mother's disability. TPR is reversed. There is a dissent.

TPR reversed and remanded to address willfulness prong when findings identify other possible factors for mother's conduct, including her disability. There is a dissent.

Findings are sufficient to support conclusion that parents each willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their children's removal under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2). The findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother is collaterally estopped from challenging conditions of removal.

The court determines the weight to give to the dispositional factors, including the bond between the parent and child when determining best interests. The child's best interests remain paramount. There was no abuse of discretion.

There was no abuse of discretion in denying the father's request to continue the TPR hearing beyond 90 days. See G.S. 7B-1109(d).

This case discusses father's willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions of the child's removal when the child was removed from mother's care,. A nexus in father's case plan and those conditions existed. Although father was incarcerated, the court considered the limitation. There is a dissent.

This opinion discusses the one year time period for waiving reviews and a court error in terminating jurisdiction when it needed to continue with DSS providing reasonable efforts for the secondary plan of reunification.

G.S. 7B-906.1(e)(1) requires court to make finding about whether it is possible for juvenile to be placed with a parent within the next 6 months, which did not occur when the court ordered guardianship at a permanency planning hearing.

Evidence supported findings that one child was abused and neglected as mother took and disseminated pornographic pictures of him and the sibling was neglected.

A court may not delegate its judicial function re: visitation, and the order must include notice of the right to request a review.

One single act during the determinative 6-month time period will not defeat the willful abandonment ground to TPR under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7).

TPR reversed on all 3 grounds( abandonment, neglect, failure to make reasonable progress), when the order was based on permanency planning hearings and orders that were legally void. DSS had custody through a relinquishment by one parent but never filed a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency such that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to interfere with father's constitutional rights to parent and hold permanency planning hearings.

Credible evidence supports the findings, even when there was contrary evidence to support a different finding. Statutory language for findings is not required if the substance of the statute is met.

G.S. 7B-602(a1) requires findings that a parent's waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary.

Clear and convincing evidence supported findings about ongoing concerns with unstable housing, DV, and substance abuse. Findings supported conclusion parents acted inconsistently with their parental rights such that guardianship order could be based on best interests. There is a dissent.

No abuse of discretion in determining private TPR was in the children's best interests.

Appeal of PPO that eliminated reunification and a TPR. There is no burden of proof in a permanency planning hearing and court's misstatement of applying a clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard was not prejudicial. The findings addressed the substance of G.S. 7B-906.2. The court did not abuse its discretion in reducing visitation.

The ICWA notices were deficient and the deficiencies were not cured with a notices sent during the post-TPR proceeding. The trial court must ensure notices are sent to each relevant tribe and the Bureau of Indian affairs and can only make a determination as to whether ICWA does not apply after the tribes & BIA fail to respond to multiple requests.

Use of stipulations by 3 of 4 parties and shifting of burden of proof to non-stipulating parties not preserved for appellate review. Concurrence addresses erroneous use of stipulations by trial court.

Unchallenged findings support adjudication of neglect.

7B-911 order affirmed; child's adjudications constituted a substantial change in circumstances permitting modification of existing Ch. 50 custody order.

Affidavits were competent evidence to support findings under G.S. 50A-207(b).

The court did not comply with G.S. 7B-911 regarding terminating 7B jurisdiction and entering Ch. 50 order with proper findings regarding a modification of an existing custody order.

Appellate Rule 2 and writ of cert granted.

No delegation of judicial function when DSS given discretion to expand mother's visits. Remanded because parties not notified of right to file motion for review. G.S. 7B-905.1.

Child's best interests are paramount consideration in disposition of TPR.

Pre-adoptive homes are by nature potential preadoptive homes.

In this 4-3 opinion, TPR affirmed. The court did not compare relationship between child and mother and child and foster parent. No abuse of discretion.

The trial court determines weight to give best interests factors (including bond with parent) and makes reasonable inferences from the evidence. No abuse of discretion in determining TPR in the children's best interests.

A TPR order is not an appealable order until after the disposition (no appeal on adjudication order only).

Trial court must strictly comply with mandate. Mandate was remand for new findings. Court had discretion to hear additional evidence and there was no abuse of discretion in failing to do so. There was no forecast of what any new evidence of changed circumstances at the time of the mandate would be in a best interests hearing.

Evidence was sufficient to support findings that were sufficient to support neglect conclusion. Domestic violence was involved in this case.

Evidence and findings were sufficient to support neglect adjudication based on father's limited progress on his case plan.

The findings were sufficient to support ground of failure to make reasonable progress. Mother did not make meaningful progress on her case plan and her intellectual disability did not prevent her from addressing the housing issues that resulted in the children's removal from care.

Dependency adjudication reversed as there were no findings about the alternative childcare arrangement and the findings and evidence showed the child with living with a parent who was willing and able to provide care and supervision. This case involves unstable housing and a lack of employment.

Guardianship order with non-relative vacated for failing to make findings and conclusions about the relative placement option required by G.S. 7B-903(a1). This opinion discusses statutory and case law precedent to place juvenile with a ramily member.

The criteria of Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence were satisfied when the court allowed a witness to testify as an expert in psychology and family evaluations.

Without an objection or argument to limit the court taking judicial notice of the nonsecure custody orders at the adjudication hearing, mother did not preserve the issue for appeal.

The opinion discusses an abused juvenile, the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, a parent inflicting serious physical injury by non-accidental means, and unexplained injuries.

In a case of first impression, the NC Supreme Court held that the status exception to minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction applies to TPR proceedings, meaning minimum contacts for the nonresident parent are not required.

TPR affirmed on ground of abandonment.

TPR on ground of neglect is affirmed. This opinion discusses judicial notice, collateral estoppel, inferences drawn by the trial court, and a respondent parent's incarceration.

There was no abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the child's best interests. The factors in G.S. 7B-1110(a) are discussed, including the child's age and preference, a lack of adoptive placement, the bond with the mother, and the likelihood of adoption when there are significant mental health issues the child is experiencing.

Evidence and findings were sufficient for court's verification that guardians understand the legal significance of their appointment as guardians.

Affirming TPR on dependency ground. Child's mental health needs requiring a Level III PRFT upon discharge from Level IV PRTF made placement with relative an inappropriate and unavailable child care arrangement.

Evidence and findings were sufficient to support the court's determination that mother acted inconsistently with her parental rights in a PPO that awarded guardianship to the foster parents.

On remand from NC Supreme Court, the COA reaffirmed its earlier holding reversing the TPR based on neglect and failure to make reasonable progress based on insufficient evidence and findings.

The TPR on willful abandonment is affirmed. Willfulness is a question of fact. The findings support father's willful action to forego all parental duties.

The clerical error in not checking the box on AOC-J-207 indicating the attorney advocate was also the GAL was a clerical and not a prejudicial error.

The findings of fact were sufficient to support the conclusion of neglect.

The NC Supreme Court reaffirmed the abuse of discretion standard of a best interests dispositional order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when giving more weight to factors other than the children's bond with their parents.

The petition provided sufficient notice of the grounds for TPR.

Remand of PPO to ensure proof of notice required by ICWA to the Indian tribes and regional BIA was provided as required by ICWA when the court had reason to know the child was an Indian child based on mother's assertion that she is of Cherokee ancestry.

Mother failed to pay reasonable portion of the cost of child's care when she had an ability to do so and her not being ordered to do so does not prohibit the court from concluding this ground exists.

The TPR based on neglect was supported by findings of fact that are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. This opinion discusses the role of the trial judge in considering evidence and an unknown cause for non-accidental injuries. There is a dissent.

Evidence of the availability of a potential relative placement was not presented at the TPR hearing. The court was not required to consider or make findings about that issue as a "relevant consideration" under G.S. 7B-1110(a) when determining that the TPR was in the child's best interests.

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother only made "some progress" on her case plan and ordering reunification be eliminated.

The court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an inquiry into mother's competency and need for a GAL under G.S. 7B-1101.1(c).

There was no bias warranting recusal when judge made statement at TPR that explained the permanency planning order that placed the child with a relative in New Jersey because of a belief that the child could not live with the parents.

Finding of mother's prioritization of relationship with father, who did not comply with case plan and was violent toward mother and children, over the children's safety was supported by evidence and supported conclusion that she failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to the children's removal

This case applies the holding of In re B.O.A., 831 S.E.2d 305 (2019) and overrules In re H.H., 237 N.C. App. 432 (2014) and In re W.V., 204 N.C. App. 290 (2010) when looking at court's authority to order a parent to remedy conditions that directly or indirectly causes the child's removal from the home.

The opinion affirms abuse based on serious physical injury by nonaccidental means as shown by bruising on a 3 year old

This opinion discusses TPR based on abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7) and vacates and remands due to insufficient findings. Findings are discussed as well as the court's authority to question witnesses during trial.

This opinion reverses a neglect adjudication based on insufficient findings. It discusses judicial notice of a prior nonsecure custody order as well as a lack of findings regarding risk of harm related to marijuana use by parents and chronic absenteeism from school.

Under G.S. 7B-906.1(n)(1), the period of at least one year means an uninterrupted period of at least 12 months in the same placement.

This opinion affirms a permanency planning order that achieves a permanent plan of guardianship, eliminates a secondary plan, and discusses findings and evidentiary issues to support the order.

There were no findings about harm or substantial risk of harm to the juvenile based on a lack of proper care, supervision, or discipline by a parent with a substance abuse problem when that parent was compliant with treatment at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.

Competent evidence requires oral testimony at a permanency planning hearing.

The findings support the conclusion of abandonment during the relevant 6-month time period. Past conduct may be considered to evaluate intent and credibility. Incarceration and defeating a prior TPR do not preclude the court from granting a TPR based on evidence that supports the findings to support a conclusion of abandonment.

A TPR order that was signed by a judge who did not preside over the TPR proceeding was a nullity and allowed for the district court to grant a Rule 60 motion and enter a new order despite mother having filed an appeal.

This opinion gives an expansive interpretation of the language in G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2) regarding conditions that led to the juvenile's removal. It also discusses the court's authority in a case plan to address both the direct and indirect causes of the child's removal rather than limit the condition to what was alleged in the petition.

Father's conduct was sufficient to support a TPR based on willful abandonment. Father could have filed a motion to modify the temporary custody order that prohibited contact between him and the children, yet he did not take any such action. The court's determination that TPR was in the children's best interests was not an abuse of discretion.

This opinion discusses the application of the UCCJEA to a 7B case when the court has retained jurisdiction.

This opinion discusses the application of the UCCJEA to a 7B case when the court has retained jurisdiction.

This opinion discusses modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when there was an initial custody determination in another state and whether NC had modification jurisdiction to proceed with a TPR. Although both parents and the child moved from the original state, mother (non-custodial parent) returned to that state and was presently residing there when the NC TPR action commenced. Without a finding by the out-of-state court that it no longer had continuing exclusive jurisdiction, NC lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

There is not statutory or constitutional right to an Anders type appellate review in a TPR.

The record is insufficient to determine whether mother was denied effective assistance of counsel when mother was not present at hearing and attorney did not advocate at hearing but did file motion to dismiss and an answer. No reasons are provided and it is unclear what state mother was in at the time of the TPR hearing or what direction she may have given her attorney or GAL. The appropriate remedy is remand for the trial court to determine whether the representation was deficient.

This opinion discusses the precedent set by In re H.L. and In re C.P. that allows the trial court at the first permanency planning hearing (PPH) to cease reunification efforts but requires that reunification be a primary or secondary permanent plan. In this case, the evidence and facts support the cessation of reunification efforts, but the trial court erred in not including reunification as one of the permanent plans at the first PPH.

Insufficient record on appeal to address mother's argument that a G.S. 7B-910 review of foster care placement was required in case where mother placed child with family friend before any DSS involvement and then via a family services agreement allowed younger child to also be placed in the family friend's home.

DSS cannot take a different position on appeal from what it argued at trial.

The appeal of the permanency planning order "ceasing reunification efforts" was rendered moot by the proper TPR, which relied on evidence about current conditions and not findings of conclusions in the PPO.

Plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence to locate and serve Defendant resulted in improper service by publication. Dismissal is appropriate.

Foster parents were not parties and did not participate as parties even though they testified as the child's current placement provider through direct examination by their attorney. Foster parent's attorney also questioned on direct and redirect an expert called by the GAL attorney advocate who requested foster parent attorney conduct the examination of the expert witness.

Court must indicate the standard of clear and convincing evidence when determining a parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected rights.

There was competent evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusion of law that the newborn was a neglected juvenile. This case has an extensive appellate procedural history based on the proper standard of review to be applied (the court of appeals may not reweigh the underlying evidence).

This opinion reverses a TPR on the ground of G.S. 7B-1111(a)(4) because of (1) insufficient notice pleading to respondent father and (2) insufficient findings to support the conclusion the ground existed.

This opinion discusses Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 in a trial for a first-degree sex offense with a child. It holds the admission of the victim's testimony regarding two prior acts by the defendant that were strikingly similar to the act for which he was charged - digital penetration of the same victim while she was in defendant's care - was not an error.

There was no evidence to support the findings that the respondent father failed to take each of the required actions of G.S. 7B-1111(a)(5) (failure to legitimate).

There was no abuse of discretion in ordering custody to the father as the child's permanent plan, based on the child's best interests.

Although the order sets for the minimim length, frequency, and whether visitation is supervised as required by G.S. 7B-905.1, it does not address the cost of visitation and whether respondent mother has an ability to pay (if she is to bear the cost).

This case distinguishes the requirements of an Anders review in criminal cases and NC Appellate Rule 3.1(d), which applies to juvenile cases. App. Rule 3.1(d) does not require the appellate court conduct an independent review of the record; however, the court of appeals has discretion to conduct the review when appropriate.

This opinion discusses App. Rule 3.1(d). The court of appeals may invoke App. Rule 2 to suspend the mandatory requirements under App. Rule 3.1(d) to serve a client with a no-merit brief, record, transcript, and notice of the right to file a pro se brief. The decision to invoke App. Rule 2 is made on a case-by-case basis, and here it applied when appellate counsel made exhaustive efforts to serve the client.

Appeal of  TPR under App. Rule 3.1(d) is dismissed as respondent father's pro se brief was untimely and failed to preserve or argue issues for appellate review. There is a concurrence and dissent.

The court only made findings addressing 3 of the 5 subsections to G.S. 7B-1111(a)(5) regarding actions taken by a father to a child born out of wedlock. The failure to address all 5 subsections requires reversal of the TPR.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when allowing the children's out-of-court statements disclosing their father's sexual abuse to (1) DSS social workers, (2) forensic evaluation interviewers, and (3) law enforcement as a residual hearsay exception. This opinion discusses the factors when applying Rule 803(24).

The trial court failed to make sufficiently specific findings to allow for appellate review of a permanency planning order that awarded guardianship to the grandmother and ceased reunification efforts with respondents. 

The permanency planning order awarding guardianship did not include findings about the parents' paramount constitutional rights, and respondents' did not waive those findings. Vacated and remanded for additional findings.  

The findings the respondent failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal or adjudication are unsupported by the evidence. This case discusses implementation of skills learned from domestic violence classes and the requirement for the progress (or lack thereof) to be related to the reasons the child was removed. In this case, those reasons were based on domestic violence and a bruise and not substance abuse, mental health issues, or parenting skills.

When placing a child in out-of-home care, the trial court is required to consider placement with a willing and able relative who can provide a safe home and must place with that relative unless there is finding that such placement would be contrary to the child's best interests. Failure to make such findings and conclusions will result in a remand. 

A vacated order becomes void and has no effect. Upon remand, a new order may be appealed on any issue.

When respondent mother's attorney complied with N.C. App. Rule 3.1(d) and respondent did not file a pro se brief, there were no issues argued or preserved for appeal.

G.S. 7B-1002 specifies those parties that have a right to appeal and includes “a guardian appointed under G.S. 7B-600 or Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, or a custodian as defined in G.S. 7B-101 who is a nonprevailing party.” A dispositional order in a prior action is not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action when the basis to void the order is non-jurisdictional. The appellants in this case, who had been awarded guardianship in a prior proceeding and before that legal and physical custody, had standing to appeal under G.S. 7B-1002.

Mother's admission was a stipulation and not a consent order. The findings from the admission about the child's poor school attendance and performance and missed doctor's visits do not support the conclusion of neglect. The incorporation by reference of the pre-adjudication order does not support the neglect adjudication. 

The trial court must make findings required by G.S. 7B-911(c) before terminating jurisdiction in the juvenile court proceeding.

Evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings verifying the custodians had adequate resources to appropriately care for the children and understood the legal significance of the placement as required by G.S. 7B-906.1(j).

In a neglect adjudication, a trial court may determine substantial risk of future abuse or neglect based on the historical facts of the case. The trial court determines how much weight to give the evidence. Here, the cumulative weight of the trial court's findings support the conclusion of neglect. The court of appeals may not reweigh the evidence.

Respondent father has the burden of proving he complied with all the requirements of G.S. 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) for his consent to an adoption to be required. Here, he failed to show by a verifiable payment record that he made consistent and reasonable payments for the mother and/or child during the relevant time period, which is the period before the petition for adoption is filed.

Defendant’s offer of proof fell within Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2), one of four exceptions in the Rape Shield Statute - “evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant." Results of the victim having STDs and the defendant not having STDs and a report by a proposed medical expert “affirmatively permit an inference that defendant did not commit the charged crime."

“The trial court ‘should not broadly incorporate written reports from outside sources as its findings of fact’ [and] … delegate its fact-finding duty” (quoting In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 511 (2004)).

The findings support termination of respondent's parental rights under the grounds of willfully failing to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal regarding two children and neglect regarding a third child. Findings about whether DSS made reasonable efforts toward reunification are required at permanency planning hearings and not a TPR, but even so, DSS provided reasonable efforts toward reunification (such efforts need not be exhaustive).

There was sufficient evidence of defendant’s actions pressuring her daughter to recant the daughter’s allegation of repeated sexual abuse by her adoptive father/defendant’s husband with the willful intent to hinder the investigation. There was insufficient evidence that defendant denied DSS or law enforcement access to her daughter to support an obstruction of justice charge on that basis. Defendant's failure to report child abuse without an allegation of an affirmative act does not support a conviction of accessory after the fact.

An adjudication of dependency under G.S. 7B-101(9) requires the trial court to address both prongs of the definition regarding (1) the parent’s ability to provide proper care or supervision and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.

Permanent plan of guardianship did not include finding under G.S. 7B-906.1(e)(1). Respondent mother waived her right to findings about her acting inconsistently with her parental rights.

Before ordering custody to a non-parent, there must be clear and convincing evidence and a finding that a parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with his or constitutionally protected status as a parent. This finding applies to a permanent custody order, even when custody is transferred from a non-parent (in this case DSS) to a different non-parent (in this case the foster parents).

"The law of the case doctrine does not apply when the evidence presented at a subsequent [TPR] proceeding is different from that presented on a former appeal,” which in this case is the six months next preceding the filing of the second (2016) petition alleging abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7).

Without a transcript or narrative in the appellate record, findings of fact are deemed conclusive on appeal, and the review of an order eliminating reunification is limited to whether the findings support the decision to cease reunification. The ultimate finding under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health and safety were supported by findings. 

Although the respondent had limited options to show her love, guidance, and affection for her child during an appeal of a previously granted TPR, she failed to attempt to make any efforts to contact or support her child or seek a stay of the TPR order. Those actions, coupled with her prior conduct, support the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment.

A placement made by a G.S. Chapter 50 civil custody order does not negate the ability of the custodian to adopt the child, despite the placement not being made pursuant to G.S. Chapter 48. The court may waive the placement requirement for cause. In a TPR, the court may consider the likelihood of the child's adoption in the dispositional phase when the placement is not made pursuant to G.S. Chapter 48.

In a review by the court of appeals upon request of respondent father's attorney when filing a no-merit brief pursuant to Appellate Rule 3.1(d), there was no error. The findings and conclusions in the TPR order were sufficient.

The mandate issues on the day the appellete court transmits the mandate to the lower court, not the day the lower court actually receives the mandate.

Findings, based on evidence, that respondent mother's progress on her case plan were limited were sufficient to support a determination of likelihood of future neglect. Where there was an underlying neglect adjudication with a determination of likelihood of reptition of neglect, the TPR was affirmed.

Findings related to alternative placement of child made by mother before petition filed by DSS and without DSS assistance do not support adjudication of dependency.

G.S. 7B-901(c)(1) requires a previous order finding facts supporting a determination that aggravating circumstances exist to order reasonable efforts for reunification are not required.

Orders that do not bear a file stamp or other indication that they were ever filed with the clerk of court have not been entered under Rule 58. Here, the orders were signed but not file stamped. Because they were not entered, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review them.

The court must make findings addressing both prongs of the dependency definition at G.S. 7B-101(9): the parent’s ability to provide proper care or supervision and the availability of an alternative child care arrangement. 

The court's G.S. 7B-906.2(b) finding that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health or safety may be made at the first permanency planning hearing. The court may consider the respondent’s failure to comply with a case plan that he voluntarily entered into before the petition was filed, even though there was no court order for him to participate in that plan, when considering whether reunification efforts would be (un)successful.

In a TPR neglect adjudication, the findings of fact must be supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, they must address the likelihood of repetition of neglect based on evidence of current circumstances, neither of which occurred in this case. This case includes circumstances where a man should not know he is the father of a child born out of wedlock.

Plaintiff was limited to one hour for the presentation of her case. She failed to request additional time or object and thus waived her right to appeal on the issue. Trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Standing is jurisdictional. For a non-parent to pursue a G.S. Chapter 50 custody action against a parent, she must show a substantial relationship with the child and that the parent acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status. The standard is clear and convincing evidence. There is no bright-line test for making the determination but the court must consider the parent's intentions. Pre-birth actions by the parent should be considered with the parent's actions taken after the child's birth. 

Discussing competent evidence to support the trial court's verification of a proposed guardians' adequate resources to appropriately care for the child, this opinion has a concurrence and a dissent and addresses previous published opinions on the issue. Although a close question, evidence supported the conclusion of adequate resources.

A juvenile may not be adjudicated "seriously neglected" as defined by G.S. 7B-101(19a).

ICWA applies when the proceeding is a "child custody proceeding" that involves an "Indian child" as both terms are defined by ICWA. Note this opinion does not apply the ICWA regulations that became effective December 12, 2016 as the TPR order was entered before that date.

Repondent's unexplained absence at TPR hearing did not implicate a constitutional right when her attorney requested a continuance. There was no abuse of discretion or prejudice to the respondent when the trial court denied the continuance request. Respondent's attorney fully participated in the hearing.

A trial court determines reasonable inferences to draw from the evidence. Findings, supported by competent evidence, that a pre-mobile infant who was in the sole care of respondents and who suffered serious non-accidental injuries that were not explained by the respondents support an adjudication of abuse. There was no shifting of the burden of proof from DSS to respondent. 

A court is not required to make findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) when it does not eliminate reunification as a concurrent permanent plan.

The court may not delegate its judicial function to determine visitation by allowing the guardian to unilaterally suspend or modify the visitation based on his or her concerns. 

When a child has been reunified with a parent, the court has waived reviews, and a new report is made resulting in an assessment by DSS that requires court action, G.S. 7B-401(b) applies. It requires that DSS file in the existing case a verified petition alleging the new allegations, and that the court conduct a new adjudicatory hearing and adjudicate the juvenile before moving to a dispositional hearing.

It is reversible error to waive further review hearings when the court does not make findings of each of the G.S. 7B-906.1(n) factors.

This opinion discusses temporary emergency jurisdiction at nonsecure custody; modification jurisdiction for adjudication and disposition; and due process arguments under the UCCJEA and Juvenile Code regarding jurisdictional issues. Subject matter jurisdiction is found and the underlying order is affirmed.

A trial court is not required to make findings of fact on all the evidence that is presented or state every option it considered as part of the best interest factor, “any relevant consideration”, set forth at G.S. 7B-1110(a)(6).

Respondents allowed to be inflicted or created a substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means by their failure to (1) maintain the special needs child's Rx and (2) provide adequate supervision, both of which resulted in injuries to the child (even if self-inflicted). 

The guardian’s return to North Carolina renders the issue of the applicability of the ICPC and respondent mother’s appeal moot.

It was not reversible error for court to fail to state in its consent adjudication order that the adjudicatory findings were based on the clear and convincing evidentiary standard under G.S. 7B-805 (applying to an adjudicatory hearing).

THIS OPINION HAS BEEN REVERSED BY THE N.C. SUPREME COURT. The opinion looked to the definition of director when holding Mecklenburg County DSS did not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of district court because the child's residence was in Rowan County and the child was not found in Mecklenburg County when petition was filed. 

A respondent parent who is called as a witness by DSS is a compelled (not voluntary) witness, who can assert or waive the V Amendment privilege against self-incrimination once the testimonial response to the question would tend to incriminate the witness. Respondent mother, who invoked the privilege, did not waive her right to the privilege and should not have been ordered to answer. Respondent parent was prejudiced as a result. 

Failure to include findings of both prongs of dependency definition is reversible error.

GS 7B-903(a1) requires the court to consider relative placement and when not placing the child with a relative, make findings that the placement with a willing and available relative who can provide a safe home is contrary to the child's best interests. This finding is required even when an evaluation of the relative's home has not been completed.

Court must comply with 7B-911 and make required findings. "Custody order" is remanded for required findings regarding Chapter 50 action and to terminate 7B jurisdiction.

Incarceration alone does not support conclusion that respondent is unable to provide a safe home for the child, which is one of two required prongs to terminate parental rights under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(9). Adjudicatory findings (and not dispositional considerations) must support the conclusion that a ground exists.

The findings did not support the conclusion that the two prongs of GS 7B-1111(a)(2) were met. The opinion also raises but does not resolve the question of whether the respondent had sufficient notice of the ground alleged.

Before ordering a permanent plan of guardianship, the court must find a parent is unfit or acted inconsistently with his constitutionally protected status. The parent did not waive those findings in this case.

A parent is not criminally liable for for causing physical injury when administering corporal punishment unless that punishment causes lasting injury or is made with malicious purpose.

Based on the record, the court properly verified that the proposed guardian had adequate resources to appropriately care for the child. At the permanency planning hearing, there was evidence of the colloquy between court and proposed guardian, the department and GAL reports, and the court's judicial notice of a prior order that addressed the proposed guardian's prior care of the child.

Deficits in findings of fact required to cease reasonable efforts were not cured in TPR order.

The court may include third persons (in this case the victim's minor children) in a GS 15A-1340.50 permanent no contact order when there are findings that such contact would constitute indirect contact with the victim.

CAUTION! REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration by In re J.A.M., 370 N.C. 464 (2018) requiring proper standard of review for findings of fact

The evidence and findings do not support the ground of dependency under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(6). Respondent father had recommended an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Findings of father's drug use were not supported by the evidence and did not show that his drug use interfered with his ability to provide proper care and supervision to his child.

Regarding cease reunification, the court based its findings on competent evidence, which included the dss report that was admitted in evidence without objection and the social worker's testimony.

The findings did not support the courts conclusion that the parent willfully abandoned her child. The findings did not address the parent's limitations on her ability to visit with the child, attend the child's games, or communicate with the father-petitioner because of her incarceration and addiction issues.

A court’s ruling on a motion in limine is preliminary in nature, and a court may reconsider the admissibility of challenged evidence based on other evidence that is presented at trial. To preserve the underlying evidentiary issue, the party must attempt to introduce the evidence at trial.

NC had subject matter jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-203 to modify a prior custody order from Illinois. The Illinois court docket entry satisfied the court order requirement that IL was relinquishing jurisdiction to NC.

The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a judicial review of placement on the Responsible Individual List (RIL). The court's jurisdiction does not end when the juvenile turns 18 prior to the hearing.

After finding that a juvenile was abused by the respondent, who is a responsible individual, the court is mandated to conclude as a matter of law that the respondent be placed on the RIL.

Personal jurisdiction is obtained over defendent when (s)he is served while physically in North Carolina.

The stipulated facts supported the court's conclusion of neglect.

Custody to a non-parent requires verification that the proposed custodian (1) understands the legal significance of the order (this was proved) and (2) has adequate resources to care for the child (there was insufficient evidence to support this finding).

Based on the court's findings, there was no abuse of discretion when the court determined there would be no visitation under GS 7B-905.1 between the mother and her child.

An adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency requires a court hearing. Stipulations of fact or a consent agreement must be made on the record and comply with GS 7B-801, -802, and -807.

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights after the child’s GAL filed a verified motion to terminate parental rights.

A child may be adjudicated neglected when the evidence and findings show the child suffered non-accidental injuries while in her parents’ custody even though there is no explanation for how those injuries occurred.

When reading two orders together, the order established a visitation plan that includes supervision, duration, and frequency and complies with G.S. 7B-905.1.

A parent can show an interest in his child's welfare despite being incarcerated. In this case there was sufficient evidence provided through the DSS social worker that the father neglected his child.

The court must make findings of each 7B-906.1(n) factor to waive further permanency planning hearings.

When an order changes a previous order by adding a no contact provision regarding a child and her grandfather, that is a change in custody. That order may be appealed under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(4).

Regarding the effect of legislative changes on "pending" cases, the amendments do not apply to written orders that are entered after the effective date when the hearing that results in the written order occurred prior to the effective date of the amendments.

Before ordering a parent to pay for supervised visits, the court must make findings of the cost of visitation and the parent’s ability to pay for it.

It is reversible error when the court does not make findings by clear and convincing evidence of all the enumerated factors in G.S. 7B-906.1(n) when ordering that permanency planning hearings are waived.

The court should not hold a permanency planning hearing when a parent objects on the basis of receiving an untimely, and therefore, deficient notice of the hearing.

Neglect adjudication requires findings that child has been harmed or is at substantial risk of suffering harm.

An unwed father satisfied all three statutory requirements mandating his consent to the child's adoption.

The trial court’s findings support the court’s conclusion that there would be a repetition of neglect based on the children living in an injurious environment because of their parents' continued incidents of domestic violence even after the children were removed from their home and adjudicated neglected.

G.S. 7B-904(d1)(3) authorizes the trial court in an A/N/D action to order a parent to “take appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the home that led to or contributed to the juvenile’s adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove custody of the children from the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker," which in this case included making a budget.

For entry of an order, N.C Civ. P. Rule 58 that an order be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the judge, and (3) filed with the clerk. The written order, and not the oral rendition, is what controls. A written judgment may differ from the oral rendition; however, if it does the appellant must file a written notice of appeal of the written judgment even if an written notice of appeal was filed after the oral judgment was rendered.

G.S. 14-318.4(d)(1) defines "serious bodily injury" as “[b]odily injury that creates a substantial risk of death...." In determining if there is a substantial risk of death, “the age and particular vulnerability of a minor victim must factor into this analysis.” Three expert witnesses who treated the child testified about the impact of bleeding on an infant’s developing brain, and how it could be life-threatening and would require monitoring for dangerous side effects that could arise as the brain continues to develop.

G.S. 7B-1000 authorizes a modification of an order based on a change in circumstances OR the needs of the juvenile. The evidence and court’s findings supported its conclusion that there was a substantial change in circumstances that affected the child’s general welfare and best interests since the entry of the review order.

When determining if termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider factors specified in G.S. 7B-1110(a). The availability of a relative for placement is not one of the designated factors, and whether a relative is available is not determinative of the child’s best interests.

A TPR based on willful abandonment requires that a parent's actions during the statutory required six-month period preceding the filing of the action are demonstrated to be wholly inconsistent with a desire to maintain custody of the child.

In misdemeanor child abuse action, the state introduced substantial evidence that Defendant created a “substantial risk of physical injury” to her 18-month child. Defendant’s reliance on findings of fact that supported conclusions of neglect in juvenile proceedings (7B actions) illustrate some circumstances that can create a substantial risk of harm to a child but are not determinative on the jury.

Both the Juvenile Code and adoption statutes differentiate between a parent and stepparent. G.S. 7B-101(3) includes stepparent in the definition of "caretaker." Caretakers do not have standing to take an appeal in an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding.

Completion of a case plan by a parent does not preclude a court's conclusion that grounds of neglect exist for TPR. When the ground is neglect, a court may look to the historical facts of the case when predicting whether neglect is likely to occur in the future.

The Confrontation Clause in a criminal trial does not apply to a 15 year old's nontestimonial statement made to a nurse as part of medical evaluation conducted at the Children's Advocacy Center. The primary purpose of the statement was for medical diagnosis and treatment to safeguard the child's mental and physical health.

Ineffective assistance of counsel includes both the deficient performance of an attorney and the degree of the deficiency being significant enough to deprive someone of a fair hearing.

A child is dependent when her parent (guardian or custodian) (1) is unable to provide for her care or supervision and (2) lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Here, the child was dependent when her mother failed to participate in the child's discharge planning from a psychiatric hospitalization.

District court lacks jurisdiction to issue custody review orders after DSS voluntarily dismisses a petition.

A county department social worker's testimony regarding events that occurred before her involvement with the case but which she learned of from the department's case record was admissible when the foundation for the business record exception to hearsay was established.

When a mother executes a relinquishment to the county department, the department obtains custody of the child. The other parent may have his rights terminated on the ground of failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for a child in department custody when the parent is physically and financially able to do so.

The findings of fact were sufficient even though some referred to the allegations in the petition and not every one was identified as having been found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The court indicated it was applying the standard of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and no other contradictory standard was included in the order.

The court had the authority under G.S. 7B-904 to order the respondent father to maintain stable employment and obtain a domestic violence assessment.

Acts that occurred in South Carolina may be considered by the North Carolina trial court when determining whether the child was neglected.

In determining neglect, a court may consider whether another child who lives in the home has been abused or neglected by an adult who regularly resides in the home. A sibling who witnessed her brother's abuse was neglected even though she herself was not physically harmed.

Respondent mother was appropriately placed on RIL and was not deprived of her right to represent herself or retain her own attorney when her court appointed attorney in the A/N/D also represented her in the RIL hearing.

The definition of abuse at G.S. 7B-101(1)c. looks to the procedures or devices a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker used to modify a child's behavior. It does not examine the child's behavior that the procedures or devices are meant to correct.

Remanded for the NC trial court to examine the Texas order and determine if TX exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction, exclusive continuing jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA when issuing its January 2014 order. Depending on the trial court’s determination of how the TX court exercised jurisdiction, the NC court must communicate with the TX court. If NC determines it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the petition.

Neglect requires the child to experience a physical or emotional impairment or substantial risk of such impairment. A single violation of a safety agreement signed by both the respondent mother and father and the mother's lack of stable housing did not place the child at risk of harm. A court should look at the totality of the evidence when determining if the child is neglected.

A termination of parental rights based on neglect requires a finding about the probability of the repetition of neglect when the child has not been in the parent’s custody for a significant period of time before the TPR hearing. Without this finding the court may not terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect set forth at G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1).

There is no kidnapping when a parent or legal custodian consents to the unlawful confinement of his own minor child, even if the child does not consent. Only one parent is required to consent.

Under G.S. 7B-1103(a), a guardian has standing to initiate a TPR; a custodian does not. A custodian will only have standing if the child continuously resided with him or her for two years preceding the filing of the TPR petition. Because standing is jurisdictional, evidence must support the court's finding that the 2-year requirement was satisfied.

A temporary disposition order is not a final order that allows for an appeal of the adjudication and initial disposition under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(3) or an order changing legal custody of a juvenile under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(4).

The court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted statements made by the eight-year old child to the DSS social worker and the forensic interviewer. The court found the criteria required under Rule 803(24) of the Rules of Evidence had been satisfied.

Testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause. In determining if a statement is testimonial, a court will apply the “primary purpose test”: was the statement made with the primary purpose of being an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Here, a child’s statement to his teacher was not testimonial and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. A mandated reporting law does not convert the primary purpose to one of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.

Emergency temporary jurisdiction under the UCCJEA limits a court’s authority to ordering temporary custody of the children to DSS. The court is without jurisdiction to order DSS to do anything beyond what is necessary to take care of the children or to consider other matters related to the custody of the children. Orders entered before the court had subject matter jurisdiction are void ab initio and evidence of mother's noncompliance with those void orders may not be considered in subsequent court proceedings.

Findings of fact must reflect the court's logical reasoning when considering the evidence.

The court does not have authority to order a parent to participate in therapy in an adjudication order. G.S. 7B-904 authorizes a court to order a parent to participate in therapy in a dispositional or subsequent order. A TPR hearing 3 months after the dispositional order is entered is insufficient to determine if the children are at risk of repetition of neglect.

When a parent is ordered to pay for the cost of supervised visitation, the court must make findings that the parent has the ability to pay.

The court did not abuse its discretion when ordering the children remain in DSS custody despite their mother completing her case plan. At disposition, the court looks at the best interests of the child.

"It is not per se reversible error for a trial court's fact findings to mirror the wording of a petition or other pleading prepared by a party."

To be neglected, a juvenile must suffer some physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or a substantial risk of such impairment.

G.S. 7B-905.1 requires the court order include the minimum frequency and length of visits and whether the visits shall be supervised.

The court did not abuse its discretion when denying a continuance after findings the respondent's decision to start a new job the week of the TPR hearing was not extraordinary circumstances.

When an order eliminates reunification as a permanent plan effectively ceases reunification efforts.

A 12-year-old boy in DSS custody is readmitted to a level IV PRTF. There was no available less restrictive setting because one had not been pursued. The child's constitutionally protected liberty interests were compromised by DSS' lackluster performance in taking timely action to secure a less restrictive discharge placement. A readmission hearing is not a custody proceeding that is automatically stayed by an A/N/D action. The issue addressing DSS' party status was not timely preserved for appeal

An order that sets forth visitation of at least one visit per month for a minimum of one hour to be supervised by the family therapist with the respondent mother to coordinate the schedule with the family therapist meets the minimum requirements of G.S. 7B-905.1.

TPR due to willfully leaving a child in foster care or other placement requires (1) that the parent willfully left the child in foster care or other placement outside the home for 12 months and (2) the parent has not made reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal. Willfulness does not require fault, but requires the parent's unwillingness to make an effort toward reasonable progress.

The findings of fact in a court order do not need to recite the statutory language. Instead, the findings may embrace the substance of the statutory language. The findings support the conclusion that reunification efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the juvenile's health and safety.

Defendant was convicted of felony child abuse on his 3-year old stepdaughter where he inflicted serious bodily injury and the jury found two aggravating factors: EHAC & victim was very young. The officer's testimony was not expert opinion testimony or a comment on the defendant's truthfulness; it was an explanation of the investigative process.

An order is the trial court’s responsibility even when a mistake is made by the counsel who prepared it. The findings of fact were inconsistent and contrary to the conclusions of law.

An adjudication cannot be ordered as a judgment on the pleadings but instead requires a hearing where evidence beyond the verified petition is required.

The court found that the child lived in an environment injurious to his welfare and was neglected despite his mother's providing for him financially, medically and educationally.

A parent who is represented by an attorney in an underlying A/N/D action continues to be represented by that attorney in the TPR action. The attorney is not provisionally appointed in the TPR. The attorney must seek to withdraw and must provide reasonable notice to the client.

A permanency planning order that does not explicitly cease reunification efforts but has a permanent plan of adoption and orders DSS to file a TPR is a cease reunification order.

Without any evidence or findings regarding the availability of an alternative child care arrangement, the child is not dependent.

Under the UCCJEA, continuing exclusive jurisdiction looks to where a party presently resides, and not the party's domicile.

Relying on the reasoning in an unpublished case, In re J.R., 233 N.C. App. 786 (2014), a proper and timely appeal of a termination of parental rights order that includes a cease reunification order as an issue for appeal properly raises the cease reunification order for appeal pursuant to G.S. 7B-1001(a)(5)a. A writ of certiorari is moot.

When a clerical error on a trial court’s order is discovered on appeal, it should be remanded for correction and ensure the record “speaks the truth.”

Father's consent is not required in adoption proceeding because he failed to make reasonable and consistent support payments within his financial means for the mother, child or both. Father also failed to grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem of assistance after determining the mother had diminished capacity but was not incompetent.

A court has jurisdiction to correct a clerical mistake in its order so long as the correction occurs before an appeal is docketed.

When the right to appeal a cease reunification order is timely preserved, the appeal may be heard if a TPR is not commenced within 180 days of the cease reunification order. To be timely, the appeal must be made within 30 days after the 180 days lapses.